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I. INTRODUCTION
Comparative sentence review-what the United States Supreme
Court has sometimes described as "proportionality review"-is a proce-
dure by which a court determines whether a death sentence is consistent
with the usual pattern of sentencing decisions in similar cases or is com-
paratively excessive.' This procedure requires the reviewing court to
identify other cases from the same jurisdiction that are "similar" in some
pertinent respect to the death sentence case under review and to decide,
in light of the sentences imposed in those other "similar" cases, whether
the death sentence being scrutinized conforms to the constitutional stan-
dard of evenhanded, consistent sentencing in capital cases.2 Legislation
in more than twenty states requires the state supreme court to conduct
some form of comparative sentence review in death sentence cases. 3 For
I A death sentence is comparatively excessive if other defendants with similar character-
istics generally receive sentences other than death for committing factually similar offenses in
the same jurisdiction. Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, Identiing Comparatively Excessive
Sentences of Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1980). The Georgia Supreme
Court has referred to that component of its mandatory appellate review process which ad-
dresses the possible existence of comparative excessiveness as "comparative sentence review."
See Ross v. State, 233 Ga. 361, 211 S.E.2d 356 (1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S.'910 (1976). The
United States Supreme Court has described the same procedure variously as "proportionality
review," "comparative review," and "comparative proportionality review." Pulley v. Harris,
52 U.S.L.W. 4141 (Jan. 23, 1984) (No. 82-1095). We prefer the term used by the Georgia
court because it avoids any possible confusion between comparatively excessive death
sentences and those which are unconstitutional because they are disproportionate to the of-
fense committed. See in/a text accompanying notes 12-29.
2 The Court has referred to the constitutional requirement of evenhanded, consistent
sentencing in capital cases on several occasions. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733,
2744 (1983); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gardner v. Flor-
ida, 430 U.S. 349, 361 (1977) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976)
(plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252-53 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 398-99 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The decisive
grievance of the [concurring opinions of Justice Stewart and Justice White] . ..is that the
present system of discretionary sentencing in capital cases has failed to produce evenhanded
justice . . ").
3 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13A, § 5-53 (b)(3) (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46b
(b)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g)(2)(a) (1979); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.075(3)(c) (Baldwin Supp. 1982); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.9
(West Supp. 1983); LA. Sup. CT. R. 28(l)(c); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414(e)(4) (1982):
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-105(3)(c) (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.014.3(3) (Vernon
1979); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-310(3) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.03 (1979) (re-
view of sentences in all cases involving criminal homicide); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 177.055
(2)(d) (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VII)(c) (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-
20A-4 C(4) (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 701.12(c)(3) (West Supp. 1980-1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1311(h)(3)(iii) (Pur-
don Supp. 1980); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(0)(3) (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.
§ 23A-27A-12(3) (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2406(c)(4) (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 17-
110.1(C) (2) (1982); WASH. RaV. CODE ANN. § 10.94.030(3)(b) (1980); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-
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example, in Georgia-whose statute has served as a model for a number
of states-the supreme court determines whether each death sentence is
"excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant."'4 In a number of other
jurisdictions state supreme courts conduct a "comparative proportional-
ity review" in death cases even in the absence of legislation. 5
Whether state supreme courts engage in some form of comparative
sentence review in death penalty cases and the manner in which they do
so may be of constitutional significance. The United States Supreme
Court has suggested that "proportionality review" can be an important
protection against arbitrary and capricious death sentences. 6 On the
other hand, inJurek v. Texas, the Court sustained the constitutionality of
a death-sentencing statute that did not provide any form of comparative
sentence review. 7 And more recently, the Court concluded in Pulley v.
Harris that the California death-sentencing statute includes sufficient al-
ternative safeguards to ensure evenhanded, consistent sentencing in cap-
ital cases despite the lack of comparative sentence review. The Court
stated, however, that comparative sentence review could be constitu-
tionally required if a capital sentencing system lacked other adequate
checks on arbitrariness.8
What is clear, however, is that individual death sentences that are
excessively severe in comparison to the sentences imposed in factually
indistinguishable cases-what we call "comparatively excessive"-do
violate the eighth amendment.9 Furthermore, in those states whose leg-
islatures or courts have adopted the comparative sentence review pro-
cess as a safeguard against arbitrary and capricious death sentences, the
manner in which the state supreme court actually conducts that review
process in a particular case may also have constitutional implications.10
Indeed, in Zant v. Stephens, the Court specifically based its decision rein-
103(d)(iii) (1977); cf. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522(3) (1979) (one factor which judge or judges
must consider prior to imposing sentence).
4 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c)(3) (1983).
5 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 258-59; State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 196-97, 560
P.2d 41, 51 (1976)(en banc), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977).
6 See Pulley v. Harris, 52 U.S.L.W. 4141 (Jan. 23, 1984) (No. 82-1095); Zant v. Stephens,
103 S. Ct. at 2742.
7 428 U.S. 262 (1976). But see Autrey v. Estelle, 104 S. Ct. 24 (granting stay of execu-
tion), motion to vacate stay denied, 104 S. Ct. 326 (1983).
8 Pulley v. Harris, 52 U.S.L.W. 4141 (Jan. 23, 1984) (No. 82-1095).
9 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (plurality opinion) (death sentence inva-
lid in a case that cannot be distinguished in any "principled way" from other life sentence
cases); see also supra note 2.
10 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1978); cf.
Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980) (denial of state-created procedural right violates due
process).
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stating a Georgia death sentence upon performance by the Georgia
Supreme Court of a comparative sentence review which "we have also
been assured" will result in the vacation of a comparatively excessive
death sentence. 1
A. THE CONCEPTS OF DISPROPORTIONALITY AND COMPARATIVE
EXCESSIVENESS
As a preliminary matter, it is useful to distinguish between death
sentences that are "comparatively excessive" in light of the lesser
sentences imposed in other comparable cases and death sentences that
violate the eighth amendment because, in comparison to the offense
committed, they are disproportionate. The concept of disproportional-
ity traditionally employed in eighth amendment jurisprudence contem-
plates a judicial judgment, informed by the values of the court and by
such indicia of contemporary community standards as legislative enact-
ments and jury decisions, that a given sanction is a disproportionate and
excessive punishment for a particular offense.' 2 Because the eighth
amendment's underlying concern is preventing the "purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering," it condemns penal sanctions
whose severity or length serve no legitimate social purpose either as a
deterrent or as a form of justifiable retribution.
13
The United States Supreme Court has invoked the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition of disproportionate punishments to invalidate death
sentences in two cases. In Coker v. Georgia, the Court ruled that death
was a "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment" for the rape
of an adult. 14 More recently, in Enmund v. Florida, the Court held that
death was a disproportionate sanction when imposed upon an accessory
to a robbery who was convicted of capital murder solely by means of the
felony-murder doctrine. 15 On the other hand, in Gregg v. Georgia, the
Court held that death was a permissible sanction in cases involving in-
tentional, aggravated murder. 16 In each of these cases the Court de-
cided the disproportionality question by considering two basic factors:
first, whether the punishment of death, society's harshest and most irrev-
ocable sanction, comported with the heinousness of the offense; and, sec-
ond, whether recent legislative authorization and judicial imposition of
the death penalty in such cases occurred with sufficient frequency to be
11 Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. at 2750.
12 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3372 (1982) (plurality opinion).
13 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
14 Id.
15 See supra note 12.
16 428 U.S. at 176-87.
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consistent with contemporary community standards.i 7
Analytically distinct from this traditional notion of constitutional
disproportionality is the concept of comparative excessiveness, with
which we are particularly concerned. Issues of comparative excessiveness
arise in cases in which the defendant's death sentence is not dispropor-
tionate in the traditional eighth amendment sense, given the nature of
his crime and the circumstances of his case. Imposing a death sentence
upon such a defendant may, nevertheless, violate the eighth amendment
if defendants convicted of the same offense in other, factually similar
cases ordinarily receive lesser sentences.18 Under these circumstances, a
death sentence would be comparatively excessive because it is dispropor-
tionate to the penalties generally imposed on other defendants whose
cases cannot be meaningfully distinguished. 19 Because the process of
comparative sentence review requires the reviewing court to evaluate
the propriety of a particular death sentence in light of the sentences
imposed in other similar cases, it is a major safeguard, at least in theory,
against comparatively excessive death sentences.
20
The concept of comparative excessiveness differs from the more
traditional notion of disproportionality in at least two important re-
spects. First, disproportionality in the traditional sense directly ad-
dresses whether a given sanction is constitutionally excessive because it
serves no useful social purpose,2 ' while comparative excessiveness ap-
proaches the same ultimate question from the perspective of even-
handedness.22  The prohibition of comparatively excessive death
17 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3372-79; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 591-600;
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173, 176-87.
18 See Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, supra note 1, at 1-17. For lower court decisions
acknowledging the eighth amendment's prohibition of comparatively excessive death
sentences see, e.g., Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3553 (1983); Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1982); Henry v. Wainwright, 661 F.2d 56
(5th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2922 (1982); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 585-86 (5th
Cir. 1981), modifted, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 181 (1982); Blake v. Zant,
513 F. Supp. at 812.
19 Godfrey v. Georgia, 466 U.S. at 433.
20 See Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, supra note 1, at 20-21; see also Zant v. Ste-
phens, 103 S. Ct. at 2749.
21 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592.
22 This perspective is dictated by the concerns expressed in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972), which the Court subsequently described as condemning capital sentencing proce-
dures that do not minimize the risk of "arbitrary and capricious" death sentences. Zant v.
Stephens, 103 S. Ct. at 2741; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 188 (plurality opinion); see also
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). In Gregg, the plurality opinion also commented:
The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-sentencing system serves as a
check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. In particular, the
proportionality review substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be sen-
tenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. If a time comes when juries generally do
not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review
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sentences thus contributes to the rational and consistent administration
ofjustice in capital cases.23 Indeed, it is for this reason that the Supreme
Court condemned the death sentence imposed in Godfrey v. Georgia, a
domestic slaying case: "There is no principled way to distinguish this
case in which the death sentence was imposed, from the many cases in
which it was not."' 24 Furthermore, preventing comparatively excessive
death sentences also ensures that those death sentences that are imposed
are consistent with contemporary community standards, an important
eighth amendment concern. 25
The second way in which the traditional notion of disproportional-
ity and the concept of comparative excessiveness differ is the manner in
which courts conduct each type of inquiry. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized that determinations of disproportionality in the
traditional sense are ultimately judicial judgments. 26 Legislative enact-
ments, prior sentencing patterns, even public opinion surveys are impor-
tant considerations, but ultimately the Justices themselves must assess
the severity of the sanction in comparison to the gravity of the offense.
By contrast, prior sentencing patterns assume much greater importance
when one decides whether a particular death sentence is comparatively
excessive. Indeed, the sentences imposed in factually similar cases pro-
vide the benchmark by which courts decide whether a particular death
sentence is excessive or evenhanded when they engage in the process of
true comparative sentence review.27
Thus, although both traditional disproportionality analysis and the
comparative excessiveness inquiry reflect a concern with sentencing pat-
terns in similar cases, the degree of importance that each attributes to
such patterns differs substantially. Additionally, when engaging in dis-
proportionality analysis, the Court has freely considered sentencing pat-
terns in similar cases on a nationwide basis. 28 Determinations of
comparative excessiveness, by contrast, characteristically limit them-
selves to statewide sentencing patterns. For instance, Georgia's test is
whether "juries generally throughout the state have imposed the death
procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a
sentence of death.
428 U.S at 206.
23 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 258-59.
24 446 U.S. at 433; see also Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. at 2749-50 (decision based in part
on Georgia Supreme Court's mandatory appellate review which will serve to vacate a death
sentence "if it is excessive or substantially disproportionate to the penalties that have been
imposed under similar circumstances").
25 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968); see Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth
& Kyle, supra note 1, at 18 n.64.
26 See supra text accompanying notes 11-16.
27 See Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. at 2742.
28 See supra text accompanying note 17.
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penalty" in similar cases,29 although Louisiana uses a more restrictive,
circuitwide standard.
30
B. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO THE APPELLATE REVIEW OF DEATH
SENTENCES
The differences in judicial method that courts employ when decid-
ing traditional claims of disproportionality and when scrutinizing a
death sentence for comparative excessiveness underscore an important
observation. Courts can review death sentence cases, either as a consti-
tutional matter or pursuant to statutory procedure, in a variety of ways,
not all of which will include a true comparative sentence review. For
example, there are cases in which state supreme courts have purported
to decide whether a particular death sentence was excessive or dispro-
portionate on the basis of generalized notions of reasonableness. 3' They
make this determination by weighing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances of the particular case under review, and by deciding
whether, under those circumstances, death appears to be a reasonably
appropriate sanction. In making this judgment the court will rely on its
own values, experience, and general familiarity with prior cases; this ap-
proach requires no explicit reference to any governing criteria and in-
volves no reference to the sentences imposed in other cases.
A more formal version of this "reasonableness" approach might be
called the "precedent-seeking" approach. 32 Here the court actually
identifies the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors and makes a
judgment on that basis as to the appropriateness of the death sentence
under review. In addition, however, the court also identifies one or
more prior cases which it regards as comparable to the case on appeal,
and which it cites as support for its decision to affirm or to vacate the
death sentence. Thus, if the court concludes that the death sentence
under review is reasonably appropriate, it will cite one or more "simi-
lar" cases that also resulted in death sentences. 33 Conversely, if the court
29 Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 425, 216 S.E.2d 258, 270 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910
(1976), quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 205.
30 LA. Sup. CT. R. 28 § 1 (c). The Fifth Circuit recently sustained the constitutionality of
Louisiana's judicial circuit wide form of proportionality review in Williams v. Maggio, 679
F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3553 (1983); see also Maggio v. Williams, 104
S. Ct. 311 (1983) (order vacating stay of execution).
31 In essence, this review process involves a de novo determination of the sentencing author-
ity's decision that the circumstances of the case being reviewed warrant imposition of the
death penalty. See, e.g., Huckaby v. State, 343 So. 2d 29 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920
(1977), Chambers v. State, 339 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1976); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
32 See Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, supra note 1, at 1 n.1.
33 Id. Interestingly, in McCaskill v. State, 344 So. 2d 1276, 1280 (Fla. 1977), the Florida
Supreme Court noted that the "precedent-seeking" approach-which that court itself some-
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considers the death sentence under review to be unreasonable or inap-
propriate, it will cite a group of "similar" life sentence cases to support
its decision to vacate the death sentence as excessive or
disproportionate.
3 4
In contrast to both the generalized "reasonableness" approach and
the "precedent-seeking" approach, a true comparative sentence review
employs a "frequency" approach, consisting of three steps.3 5 First, the
court decides which features of the death sentence case under review
will govern the selection of other cases as "similar." Second, using those
criteria, the court identifies those other "similar" cases and determines
the frequency with which defendants received death sentences in those
similar cases. Finally, the court decides whether death sentences were
imposed so infrequently in this class of similar cases as to make imposi-
tion of the death penalty in the case under review comparatively exces-
sive. In making this judgment, the court must consider with what
regularity death sentences must be imposed in an identifiable class of
cases either to serve as an effective deterrent to others or to constitute a
justifiable form of retribution in light of contemporary community
standards.
3 6
As the foregoing discussion indicates, there are certain similarities
between the "precedent-seeking" form of appellate review and the "fre-
quency" approach characteristic of a true comparative sentence review.
Furthermore, the "precedent-seeking" approach can, on occasion, iden-
tify death sentences that are comparatively excessive. The difference be-
tween the two methods, however, deserves emphasis. They both require
the reviewing court to scan prior cases and to evaluate the death sen-
tence under review on the basis of the sentences imposed in prior cases
regarded as comparable. A "precedent-seeking" court, however, will be
satisfied upon finding one or two prior cases, the circumstances of which
make them suitable benchmarks for the death sentence on appeal. By
contrast, the "frequency" approach requires a survey of the sentencing
results in all prior cases deemed to be similar to the case on appeal be-
cause it is the frequency with which life sentences result in that entire
class of cases that determines whether the death sentence on appeal is
excessive or evenhanded. For this reason, while a "precedent-seeking"
times employs, see supra note 32-is probably constitutionally deficient as a safeguard against
comparatively excessive death sentences.
34 See, e.g., Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. at 815-18.
35 See Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, supra note 1, at 16, 22.
36 In Furman v. Georgia, Justice White suggested that regularity in the imposition of death
sentences must be judged on the basis of these criteria. 408 U.S. at 311-12 (White, J., concur-
ring); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 222-24 (White, J., concurring). More recently, a
majority of the Court appears to have joined in Justice White's approach. See Enmund v.
Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3377-79.
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approach may be a useful tool for deciding whether a given death sen-
tence is disproportionate in the traditional sense, only a true compara-
tive sentence review, utilizing the "frequency" approach, can
adequately address the question of comparative excessiveness.
C. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE SENTENCE REVIEW
Once a court decides to engage in comparative sentence review, it
must resolve a series of preliminary questions. To begin with, the court
must decide what group of cases it will examine in search for those cases
that are "similar" to the death sentence case under review. We call this
group of cases the universe of potentially similar cases. In other words,
the court must begin its search for "similar" cases by deciding what the
limits of that search will be.
In connection with this decision, certain guiding principles do exist.
Clearly, for example, the universe of potentially similar cases should in-
clude all recent cases from the reviewing court's jurisdiction 3 7 in which
the sentencing authority actually decided whether to impose a death
sentence. Although some state supreme courts sometimes limit their re-
view of comparable cases to those cases in which the defendants only
received death sentences,38 such a restriction is flatly inconsistent with
the entire purpose of comparing sentences; it reduces the review process
to a "precedent-seeking" exercise, with all the deficiencies that approach
entails.
Other parameters of the universe of potentially similar cases are less
clear-cut. For example, should the reviewing court only examine cases
arising under the current capital sentencing statute or can it properly
include cases arising under the pre-1972 sentencing procedures con-
demned in Furman v. Georgia?39 Another question is what procedural
stages the universe of potentially similar cases should include. One pos-
37 Arguably, one could include factually similar cases from other jurisdictions in this uni-
verse, as is the United States Supreme Court's custom when engaging in traditional dispro-
portionality analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. However, the Court has given
no indication that determinations of comparative excessiveness should be governed by inter-
state standards. On the contrary, it sustained the Georgia, Florida and Texas statutes in 1976
in part because each required appellate review by a court with statewide jurisdiction. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 198; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 259-60; Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. at 276; see also supra note 22.
38 See, e.g., Williams v. Indiana, - Ind. -, -, 430 N.E.2d 759, 764, appeal dismissed, 103
S. Ct. 33 (1982); Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969
(1977); see also supra note 33.
39 In Gregg, the United States Supreme Court concluded that using pre-Furman cases for
comparative purposes "was necessary at the inception of the new procedure" and was, there-
fore, constitutionally permissible. 428 U.S. at 204 n.56. Whether using cases decided under a
different sentencing procedure is methodologically sound, however, presents a different
question.
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sibility is that it should only include cases in which the sentencing au-
thority actually decided what sentence to impose. Another alternative is
that it should also include cases in which the jury convicted the defend-
ant of a lesser offense or in which the prosecutor did not seek a death
sentence, as part of a plea bargain or otherwise.40
Another important methodological question concerns the status of
potentially similar capital cases that resulted in convictions which, for
one reason or another, the defendants never appealed.4 1 Identifying and
securing adequate information about such cases can entail enormous
practical difficulties; it is much easier to limit the universe of potentially
similar cases to appealed cases, for which records already exist in the
court's own files. However, since unappealed capital cases virtually al-
ways involve lesser sentences than death, a failure to include them in the
universe of potentially similar cases can bias the ultimate determination
of comparative excessiveness to the defendant's disadvantage.
Even after one has resolved the methodological issues concerning
the universe of potentially similar cases, other issues remain. A principal
question concerning the conduct of comparative sentence review in-
volves selecting those features of the death sentence case under review
that will serve to identify other cases as "similar." There seem to be two
major approaches. The first is to select similar cases using a limited
number of fact-specific criteria. Thus, a court might conclude that the
relevant aggravating and mitigating features of a particular case were as
follows: (a) the defendant killed one victim, (b) in the course of an
armed robbery, (c) without any apparent provocation by the victim,
and (d) the defendant has no prior criminal record. When identifying
other cases as "similar" to such a case using a fact-specific approach, the
court would look for other cases with these same factual characteristics.
The second basic approach is to estimate the overall culpability of
each case in the universe of potentially similar cases, ideally in quantifi-
able form, and to rank each case in terms of its relative culpability level.
One then selects as similar to the case under review other cases of com-
parable overall culpability. This approach requires the court to balance
the aggravating and mitigating features of each case in the universe of
similar cases when assessing its overall culpability. For example, when
conducting a comparative sentence review of a death case involving two
victims but no other special aggravating circumstances, a court might
view as equally culpable another case involving one victim, an elderly
40 For example, see the majority opinion and Justice Seiler's dissent in State v. Mercer,
618 S.W.2d I (Mo.)(en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
41 See Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, supra note 1, at 4 n.13.
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person, whose life the defendant had taken in a prolonged and unneces-
sarily painful manner.
D. WHY STUDY GEORGIA?
In order to test the efficacy of an operating system of comparative
sentence review, we selected that of the Georgia Supreme Court for sev-
eral reasons. First, the Georgia statute has served as a model for many
other states. Second, in Gregg v. Georgia, in the course of deciding that
the Georgia statute was constitutional on its face, the United States
Supreme Court repeatedly stressed the requirement of a comparative
sentence review in every death penalty case as a means of preventing
arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory death sentences.42 Third, be-
cause the Georgia statute has operated for a substantial period of time
and because both homicides and capital convictions occur in that state
with relative frequency, it offered sufficiently numerous data to permit
the use of statistical tools. Lastly, and most importantly, Georgia of-
fered us an opportunity to evaluate the significance, if any, of the differ-
ences between the manner in which the United States Supreme Court in
Gregg assumed the Georgia statute would operate and what has actually
occurred.
That such differences do exist is beyond dispute. In Gregg the
Court presumed that juries would choose to impose the death penalty in
every case in which a statutory aggravating circumstance was present
and the evidence seemed to merit such a penalty.43 In fact, however, no
such uniformity of treatment has occurred. Although Georgia juries im-
pose the death penalty at a relatively frequent rate in most cases in
which penalty trials occur, there are many, many cases in which defend-
ants who are guilty of equally aggravated crimes escape the possibility
of a jury-imposed death sentence through prosecutorial intervention.
This fact alone introduces a confound into the Georgia system that un-
derscores the necessity in practice for an effective and consistent system
of comparative sentence review.
II. GEORGIA'S SYSTEM OF COMPARATIVE SENTENCE REVIEW
Georgia's statute requires the state supreme court to determine
whether each death sentence is "excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the
42 428 U.S. at 198, 204-07; id. at 223-24 (White, J., concurring); see also Zant v. Stephens,
103 S. Ct. at 2742, 2750.
43 Id. at 196-99 (plurality opinion); id. at 224-26 (White, J., concurring); see also infra note
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defendant.""4 When performing this task, the court customarily in-
cludes in its opinion an appendix listing the names and citations of the
other cases deemed to be "similar" which support its ruling regarding
the proportionality of the death sentence being reviewed. 45 To assist the
court in selecting similar cases, the Georgia statute requires the trial
judge in each death case to complete a standardized questionnaire pre-
pared and supplied by the Georgia Supreme Court.46 In addition, the
statute authorizes the appointment of an "Assistant to the Supreme
Court" whose functions include accumulating the records of "all capital
felony cases in which sentence was imposed after January 1, 1970, or
such earlier date as the Court may deem appropriate. '47 The statute
requires this Assistant to provide the court with whatever information it
desires with respect to each of these prior cases, "including but not lim-
ited to a synopsis or brief of the facts in the record concerning the crime
and the defendant." 48 During the post-Furman period covered by this
study, 1973-78, a principal function of this Assistant was to receive and
to file the questionnaire sent to the court in each death case. 49 In addi-
tion, the Assistant prepared for the court's use a brief synopsis of every
appealed capital murder case decided after January 1, 1970, whether or
not it resulted in a death sentence.
50
A. THE UNIVERSE OF POTENTIALLY SIMILAR CASES
The Georgia statute does not explicitly define the universe of cases
from which the court is to select "similar" cases when conducting a com-
parative sentence review. The statute does suggest, however, that this
universe of potentially similar cases should include all murder convic-
tions in which sentence was imposed after January 1, 1970.51 In prac-
tice, the court limits its search to post-1969 murder cases in which the
defendant took an appeal. 52 Because the Georgia Supreme Court al-
44 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c)(3) (1983).
45 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(e) (1983) states that: "The court shall include in its decision
a reference to those similar cases which it took into consideration."
46 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(a) (1983).
47 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537() (1983).
48 Id.
49 Deposition of Dennis York, Esq., former Assistant for Proportionality Review, Nov. 13,
1978, in House v. Balkcom, No. C78-1417A, at 13 (N.D. Ga. filed Nov. 15, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as York Deposition 1978].
50 Id. at 34-36, 47-49.
51 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537() (1983) states that: "The Court shall accumulate the
records of all capital felony cases in which sentence was imposed after January 1, 1970, or
such earlier date as the court may deem appropriate."
52 The Georgia Supreme Court has defended the policy of considering only appealed
cases on the ground that the appealed cases "represent a sufficient cross section of similar
cases upon which an adequate comparative review can be made." Ross v. State, 233 Ga. 361,
365-66, 211 S.E.2d 356, 359 (1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976). The United States
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ways reviews death penalty cases, one consequence of this policy is that
the universe of potentially similar cases includes all death sentence
cases53 but excludes life sentence cases which do not result in appeals. It
is also the court's practice to include in the universe of potentially simi-
lar cases death sentence cases in which the court never conducted a com-
parative sentence review because it reversed the conviction or vacated
the death sentence on unrelated grounds.
54
Some of the Georgia Supreme Court's opinions also suggest that its
universe of potentially similar post-Funnan cases includes only those
cases in which a penalty trial occurred and the jury actually decided
whether to impose a life or death sentence. 55 Such a requirement
would, of course, exclude from the universe of potentially similar cases
every capital case in which a convicted defendant avoided the death
penalty because, as part of a plea bargain or otherwise, the prosecutor
declined to seek a penalty trial.56 The impact of such a requirement
would be enormous. In actual practice approximately two-thirds of the
defendants in our study who were convicted of murder after a jury trial
received an automatic life sentence without the participation of the jury
because either the prosecutor waived the trial or the judge took the issue
from the jury.
57
Supreme Court approved of this policy in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 204 n.56 (1976)
("The Georgia court has the authority to consider [unappealed] cases . . 2).
53 In our sample of 113 death sentences, four cases involved no appeal in part because the
trial court vacated the jury's death sentence.
54 The Georgia Supreme Court has never addressed the propriety of this practice in any
reported opinion so far as we know.
55 The possibility that some justices may have applied such a policy is suggested by such
decisions as Goodwin v. State, 236 Ga. 339, 345, 223 S.E.2d 703, 707 (1976) ("not unusual for
juries in Georgia to impose the death penalty"); Pryor v. State, 238 Ga. 698, 708, 234 S.E.2d
918, 927 (1977)("diverse juries in widely separated counties . . . have imposed the death
penalty"); Tucker v. State, 244 Ga. 721, 732-38, 261 S.E.2d 635, 643 (1979) ("juries have
given the death penalty"); Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 425, 216 S.E.2d 258, 270 (1975), cerl.
denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976) ("juries generally throughout the state"). A formal penalty trial
requirement for inclusion in the universe of potentially similar cases exists in other jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d at 11, 20-21 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
56 When a defendant has pled guilty to murder, GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2528 gives the judge
the discretion to impose a life or death sentence after a penalty trial and § 27-2503(b) pro-
vides that when a jury convicts a defendant of murder "the court shall resume the trial and
conduct a pre-sentence hearing before the jury and the judge will enter sentence as recom-
mended by the jury." Although these statutory sections suggest that a penalty trial is
mandatory when a defendant is convicted of murder, especially if convicted by a jury, in
practice there is no penalty trial if the prosecutor does not affirmatively seek it, and the de-
fendant receives an automatic life sentence.
57 The trial transcripts of appealed cases are sometimes unclear whether the prosecutor
unilaterally waived the death sentence, the trial judge decided not to conduct a penalty trial,
or the prosecutor and the judge jointly decided not to hold a penalty trial.
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B. REVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL DEATH CASES
Apparently, the Georgia Supreme Court's practice is to assign the
identification of similar cases in any death sentence case to the "author
judge" assigned to write the court's opinion.5 8 This practice may ex-
plain the various approaches to comparative sentence review reflected in
the court's opinions. 59 In some cases, in connection with this task, the
author judge may request the court's Assistant for Proportionality Re-
view to provide summaries of cases with the characteristics specified by
the author judge. The Assistant for Proportionality Review performs
this task by manually searching through the more than 700 cases for
which summaries have been prepared.6° However, the Assistant's depo-
sition concerning the court's practices during the period covered by this
study suggests that such requests for assistance in finding "similar cases"
were infrequent. Apparently, in a large number of cases the author
judges relied principally upon their own records and memory of prior
decisions when identifying similar cases.6'
C. THE IDENTIFICATION OF SIMILAR CASES
The opinions of the Georgia Supreme Court reveal no common
method for selecting the characteristics of the death sentence case under
review used for choosing "similar" cases. In many opinions the method-
ology is not disclosed; the court simply states that it compared the re-
view case with the evidence and sentence in similar cases, and that-those
listed in the appendix support the determination that the death sentence
under review is not disproportionate or excessive.
6 2
Other Georgia Supreme Court opinions indicate that the court, or
the author judge, used a fact-specific approach to selecting similar cases.
Less frequently, however, does such an opinion identify the specific fac-
tors employed. For example, in Legare v. State ,63 the court concluded
that the defendant's death sentence was not excessive or disproportion-
ate. It prefaced that determination with the following summary of the
facts of the case: The defendant "broke into the victim's home, ran-
58 York Deposition 1978, supra note 49, at 39. Neither the deposition nor the court's opin-
ions indicate the role of the court as a body in resolving comparative sentence review issues.
59 The principal variation observed is the procedure used to select the facts of the death
sentence case under review used to identify similar cases. For further discussion, see infia text
accompanying notes 62-77.
60 York Deposition 1978, supra note 49, at 50-54.
61 Deposition of Dennis York, Esq., former Assistant for Proportionality Review, May 14,
1979, in McCorquodale v. Balkcom, No. C 79-95A, at 26-27, 34-35 (N.D. Ga. filed May 17,
1979) [hereinafter cited as York Deposition 1979].
62 See, e.g., Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 311, 253 S.E.2d 710, 718 (1979); Alderman v.
State, 241 Ga. 496, 512, 246 S.E.2d 642, 652, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 999 (1978).
63 243 Ga. 744, 257 S.E.2d 247, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
BALDUS, PULASKI, AND WOODWORTH
sacked it, and lay in wait for the victim's return, brutally beat him to
death, took his automobile and made his getaway."'64 But at no point
does the Legare opinion identify which of these facts, if any, the court
employed when selecting the "similar" cases listed in the appendix for
comparative purposes. Thus, any one or more of the following five fea-
tures could be relevant:
(1) the place of the crime and the defendant's mode of entry,
(2) premeditation and lying in wait,
(3) a contemporaneous crime-burglary,
(4) a brutal, painful method of killing, or
(5) commission of a subsequent crime by the defendant.
65
Lastly, a number of Georgia Supreme Court opinions are relatively
informative about the salient features of the death sentence case being
reviewed which the court employed to select other "similar" cases.
Sometimes the court describes these features in terms of the statutory
aggravating circumstances involved in the case, such as a contempora-
neous capital felony,6 6 for example, or a homicide committed for mone-
tary gain. 67 More commonly, however, the court describes the salient
factors used for selecting similar cases in a more fact-specific manner.
Examples include references to the invasion of a home and an execu-
tion-style murder in which the defendant was the prime mover;68 to a
robbery or burglary of a victim's home; 69 to the callous, intentional,
methodical murder of a helpless kidnap victim; 70 or to the victim's sta-
tus as a robbery witness.
7 1
When the Georgia Supreme Court does identify the factual circum-
stances used for selecting similar cases, mitigating factors appear to play
only a minor role. Occasionally, the court will include a mitigating cir-
cumstance among the criteria used for selecting similar cases.72 Usually,
64 Id. at 759, 257 S.E.2d at 257.
65 An analysis of the factual patterns of the 18 cases cited by the court as similar indicates
that the only characteristic shared by all of these cases was the presence of a contemporaneous
felony (although in two of the cases the only contemporaneous crime was another murder).
Also, all but two of the cases involved a brutal killing (stabbing, beating, strangulation) or an
execution-style murder, and most of the cases involved victims who were middle-aged or
older. All but two of the 18 cases involved multiple victims.
66 Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 600, 261 S.E.2d 349, 358 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938
(1980).
67 Douthit v. State, 239 Ga. 81, 90, 235 S.E.2d 493, 499-500 (1977), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
938 (1980).
68 Hill v. State, 237 Ga. 794, 802-03, 229 S.E.2d 737, 743 (1976).
69 Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 865-66, 213 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S.
910 (1976).
70 Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. 68, 78, 263 S.E.2d 109, 113, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980).
71 Tamplin v. State, 235 Ga. 20, 27, 218 S.E.2d 779, 784, modifedon other ground, 235 Ga.
774, 221 S.E.2d 455 (1975).
72 Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 341, 240 S.E.2d 833, 842 (1977) (Hill, J., concurring).
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however, the court only discusses mitigating factors when explaining
why the mitigating circumstances invoked by a defendant are insuffi-
cient to distinguish his case from other cases in which death sentences
were imposed.
73
Although no Georgia Supreme Court opinion indicates that the
court has ever employed an overall culpability method for selecting
comparable cases, there is some evidence of its use. An analysis of the
factual circumstances of cases that the court identifies as "similar" in its
appendices suggests that the court sometimes selects as "similar" cases
that are factually quite different from the death sentence case under
review. Presumably, therefore, the court selected these cases because it
regards the defendant on appeal and those in the "similar" cases as com-
parable in terms of relative culpability.
A possible example of the overall culpability method at work is
Case 495.74 Before committing the murder for which the jury sentenced
him to death, Defendant 495 shot another person; then, without provo-
cation he shot and killed the victim, a defenseless stranger who had re-
sponded to the defendant's request for assistance; later, in an effort to
avoid arrest, the defendant engaged in a shoot-out with the police. In
ruling that Defendant 495's death sentence was not disproportionate,
the Georgia Supreme Court cited fourteen "similar" death sentence
cases, 75 six of which involved facts that were clearly more aggravated
One explanation for the infrequent reference to mitigating circumstances may be the policy
of the Assistant for Proportionality Review during the period of this study not to include all
mitigating circumstances in his case summaries. York Deposition 1978, supra note 49, at 43.
73 Tucker v. State, 244 Ga. at 732-33, 261 S.E.2d at 643; Bowen v. State, 241 Ga. 492,
495-96, 246 S.E.2d 322, 324-25 (1978). Tucker suggests that a mitigating circumstance in a
death sentence case will not distinguish it from other "similar" death sentence cases ifjuries
have given a death sentence in other cases in which that mitigating feature was also present.
74 Case 195-Death Sentence Case Under Review. The 30-year-old male defendant, diagnosed
as a paranoid schizophrenic, kidnapped the victim who had been lured from his house to aid
another whom the defendant had wounded. Without provocation, the defendant shot the
victim as he pled for his life and took his personal belongings. The defendant was then ar-
rested after a shoot-out with the police.
7 5 APPENDIX CASES:
Case 074
The defendant bound and killed two victims in their home while committing robbery. He
was later characterized as depraved of mind after laughing about the murders.
Case 576
With premeditation, the defendant bound, strangled, tortured, and robbed two elderly vic-
tims, both of whom died.
Case 551
The defendant sexually tortured, mutilated and killed a woman he forcefully brought home
from a bar. Motive: "To teach that 'nigger-lover' a lesson."
Case 571
While on a crime spree, the defendant beat, robbed, and killed three elderly victims in their
homes.
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because of the number of victims or the level of violence and cruelty. 76
Many of the other cases cited as "similar" were factually quite different.
However, after weighing the aggravating factors in these appendix
cases, especially the level of pain inflicted, against the mitigating factors,
one could reasonably conclude that, despite their factual dissimilarity,




The defendant sodomized and strangled two 7-year-old boys, killing both.
Case 362
Characterized as having a mental disorder, the defendant forced entry and robbed his vic-
tim's home. He terrorized the family and shot the victim, who died the following day. Pre-
meditation may or may not have been involved.
Case 577
The mentally unbalanced defendant killed a stranger who reminded him of his stepmother.
Case 420
The young defendant, characterized as a sexual deviant, raped and murdered his victim with-
out premeditation.
Case 494
The defendant, a disgruntled bank customer, beat, shot, and killed a bank vice-president in
his home. Later, the defendant sought to extort money from the bank with a hostage claim.
Case 578
The mentally retarded defendant killed his ex-wife after beating her and carving initials in
her body.
Case 581
Seeking revenge, the sexually frustrated defendant threw his girlfriend's 2-year-old child off a
bridge.
Case 627
The defendant and his coperpetrator robbed, bound, gagged, beat, and shot the victim five
times before burying him alive to prevent their identification. Defense claimed insanity and
the use of drugs; neither was substantiated by experts. Prosecution claimed the defendant
confessed.
Case 628
Defendant was a 20-year-old equipment operator, with two coperpetrators. Victim was a
male insurance salesman. Defendant and coperpetrator # 1 killed victim when he came to
collect insurance premiums. Victim was robbed, taken to wooded area, tied to a tree, and
forced to watch while defendant and coperpetrator # 1 dug a shallow grave. Victim was
pleading for his life. Victim was put into grave and shot five times (once in head). None of
these shots killed victim, so coperpetrator # 1 hit victim with a shovel. Victim was buried
while still trying to speak.
Case 307
Defendant, 18-year-old male, forced victim (a stranger picked at random at shopping center)
to a wooded area and shot her three times in the head with a .45 caliber revolver.
See infra Appendix A of this Article for a similar listing of review and appendix cases
from 13 additional death sentence cases affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court.
76 Cases 074, 576, 551, 571, 553, 628, supra note 75.
77 Cases 362, 577, 420, 494, 578, 581, 627, supra note 75. Another example of a judge
intuitively applying an overall culpability approach is State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d at 20-22
(Seiler, J., dissenting).
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III. ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY
A. THE ISSUES
Our objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Georgia
Supreme Court's system of comparative sentence review. We sought to
determine the extent to which the actual operation of Georgia's sentence
review process has ensured that no person "sentenced to die by the ac-
tion of an aberrant jury" would actually "suffer a sentence of death," as
the United States Supreme Court assumed in the Gregg decision. 78
We first examined jury death-sentencing patterns from 1973 to
1978 for evidence of arbitrariness and comparative excessiveness. We
then assessed the impact of the Georgia court's decisions on those pat-
terns. Finally, we considered why the Georgia court's performance may
have fallen short of the expectations of the United States Supreme
Court expressed in Gregg v. Georgia.
The foundation of our evaluation is an assessment of the degree of
comparative excessiveness in Georgia's death-sentencing system. Since
an inconsistent or comparatively excessive death sentence is not self-evi-
dent, the validity of the methodology we used to identify potentially
excessive sentences is central to the credibility of our conclusions. In the
next section we describe that methodology in detail.
B. METHODOLOGY
We note at the outset that an exact replication of the Georgia
Supreme Court's comparative sentence review procedures is impossible.
One reason is that the opinions of the Georgia court do not include
sufficient detail to reveal the precise methodology employed. Moreover,
there is some evidence that the methodology employed may vary from
case to case, depending upon the predelictions of the author justice.
More importantly, however, there is no universally accepted method for
identifying cases that are "similar" to a given death case.
Nevertheless, we believe that the methods we have developed for
these purposes are quite reliable. Each applies or builds upon an ap-
proach already in use by one or more courts.79 Also, our methodology
employs a computer-based data management system that is more com-
prehensive and systematic than any in current judicial use. Although
we know of no other more relevant or reliable measures of comparative
excessiveness than those which we employ in this analysis, we fully ex-
pect that improved methods of comparative sentence review will emerge
as courts develop more experience with the process. Even with the meth-
78 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 206.
79 See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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ods we apply here, a final judgment about the comparability of the cases
identified as similar by them or by the Georgia Supreme Court must
await a case-by-case comparison of the records or narrative summaries
of those cases. For all these reasons, we consider our results only prima
facie evidence of the hypotheses we test.
. The Data
The analysis employed two data sets. The first consisted of 130 pre-
Furman murder defendants tried and sentenced by a jury between Janu-
ary 1, 1970 and September 29, 1972, the date of Furman v. Georgia.8 0
Twenty of these defendants received a death sentence. The second data
set consists of 594 defendants tried and sentenced for murder under
Georgia's post-Furman death-sentencing statute.8 ' In 190 of these cases
there was a penalty trial, and in twelve additional cases two or more
penalty trials occurred. The result was 203 penalty trials with 113 death
sentences imposed upon 100 different defendants.
2. Measurng Comparative Excessiveness
We use seven measures of comparative excessiveness in this study.
Three are designed to assess the excessiveness of an individual death
sentence and are modeled after the methods currently used by state
80 This data set included all such cases in the files of the Georgia Department of Offender
Rehabilitation as of January 1979 for which a file was available in Georgia's Department of
Pardons and Paroles.
81 These cases include all offenders who were arrested and charged with murder in the
state of Georgia between March 28, 1973 and June 30, 1978 and who later received a life or
death sentence after trial or were sentenced to death after pleading guilty to murder. These
594 defendants represent all such offenders (a) who appealed their convictions to the Georgia
Supreme Court, or (b) whose names appeared in the files of the Georgia Department of Of-
fender Rehabilitation as of January 1979 and whose cases were available in the files of Geor-
gia's Department of Pardons and Paroles.
Neither the pre- nor post-Furman samples include cases in which a sentence was imposed
between the date of Furman v. Georgia and the date of the enactment of the revised death-
sentencing statute March 28, 1973. We excluded such "transition" cases from the sample
because post-Furman juries could not lawfully impose death sentences. Transition cases show
that some death sentences were imposed by juries during this time, Furman v. Georgia notwith-
standing. The difficulty is that when life sentences were imposed in transition cases we were
unable to determine whether the jury imposed the sentence or the court had given a life
sentence because of Furman v. Georgia.
For each case we developed a separate file, including information on over 200 potentially
aggravating or mitigating factors. We obtained data on these factors from official records in
the Georgia Supreme Court, the Georgia Department of Offender Rehabilitation, the Geor-
gia Department of Pardons and Paroles, and the Georgia Bureau of Vital Statistics; when
necessary we also sent questionnaires to defense counsel and prosecutors.
A copy of the questionnaire used to collect these data, as well as the codebook for over
200 "recode" variables created from the original questionnaire variables, are on file with the
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supreme courts. The four other measures are designed to measure sys-
tem-wide excessiveness from different perspectives.
a. Case specific measures of comparative excessiveness
Georgia's proportionality review statute requires the Georgia court
to determine whether each death sentence it affirms is excessive or dis-
proportionate when compared to the sentence "imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.18 2 The statute gives no
further guidance, however, on the method to be used in identifying simi-
lar cases. Nor do the courts or the literature reveal a uniformly accepted
approach.8 3 Given this lack of consensus, we have adopted a "triangula-
tion" approach: we employ three different methods for identifying
"similar" cases for comparative purposes with explicit recognition of the
potential biases or unreliability of each.84 This use of several different
methods serves to cross-check the results of each.
(I) The salient factors method
Our first measure of comparative excessiveness classifies other cases
as "similar" in terms of what we call the salient factors of the death case
under review. These salient factors include those features of the case
that seem most likely to have affected the jury's sentencing decision.
The salient factors method suggests itself as a method for identifying
similar cases because it approximates the apparent intent of the Georgia
legislature. In addition, it is clearly the method which the Georgia
Supreme Court purports to apply in its comparative sentence reviews.
85
When employing this method, one usually begins by classifying
other cases in terms of any statutory aggravating circumstances present
in the death sentence case under review. Then one further refines the
selection process by using other factors which seem to be particularly
relevant to the death-sentencing decision in the review case.86 One then
82 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c)(3) (1983)
83 See supra note 64.
84 See Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, supra note 1, at 16-64, for a discussion of the
strength and weaknesses of the three methods used here for identifying similar cases; see also
Mosteller, Assessing Unknown Numbers: Order ofMagnitude Estimation in STATISTICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 163, 175 (W. Fairley & F. Mosteller eds. 1977), for a discussion of the triangulation
concept.
85 York Deposition 1979, upra note 61, at 18-20; York Deposition 1978, supra note 49, at
50-54. Similar methods are commonly used to evaluate claims of purposeful discrimination
against individuals in employment discrimination cases, where the comparisons are called
,(comparative" statistics.
86 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. at 433, suggests that when differentiating between death
eligible cases, the reviewing court should limit itself to case characteristics that are "rational"
in terms of the goals of capital punishment, or some more specific objective suggested by the
statutory aggravating circumstance involved in the case. Godrey itself said that the presence
BALDUS, PULASKI, AND WOODWORTH [Vol. 74
searches for other cases that resemble the case under review in terms of
the identified salient factors. Cases that match the review case with re-
spect to a sufficient number of factors consitutute the pool of "similar"
cases for comparative purposes.
As noted earlier, however, even in states with a large number of
murder convictions, one rarely finds more than a very few cases that
closely match the review case in terms of such important salient features
as the statutory aggravating factor involved, the defendant's prior rec-
ord and role in the crime, the number of victims, and other important
factors. Consequently, when using the salient factors method, it is fre-
quently necessary to relax the selection criteria in order to obtain a suffi-
ciently large pool of similar cases to estimate with confidence the
treatment of similar defendants. As a result, this pool expands to include
cases which do not resemble the review case in all particulars, but which
are similar in terms of overall culpability. Thus, one may treat as simi-
lar cases involving either a kidnapping or an armed robbery, or cases in
of a bloody, gruesome scene would not be a rational basis for distinguishing cases under a
statutory provision that made "depraved" murderers death-eligible. Id.
Another issue that arises at this point is whether the classifying of factors used to distin-
guish the cases should be limited to those that are known to have influenced or caused the
jury to impose a death sentence. State courts have expressed concern over their ability to
identify causal factors beyond the aggravating factors on which the death sentence is based.
See, e.g., State v. Copeland, - S.C. -, -, 300 S.E.2d 63, 77 (1982). Indeed, the determina-
tive reasons for a death sentence are probably unknowable even to the jurors who made the
decision.
The United States Supreme Court, however, does not appear to contemplate proof of the
causal factors in a case beyond the death-justifying statutory aggravating circumstances. The
concern of the Court is that the death-sentencing decision "be and appear to be, based on
reason rather than caprice or emotion." Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. at 433 (emphasis ad-
ded) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)). This language implies that a
court will never know all of the reasons why a death sentence was imposed. It suggests only
that to the extent they are known, the actual causal factors must be based on reason and that
the same test applies to the factors that appear to have influenced the decision. The implica-
tion is clear that the reviewing court should make a determination of the factors that appear
to have been the basis for the death sentence decision under review and then assess their
rationality.
Another issue confronting a court at this point in the analysis is whether the characteris-
tics of the case selected for matching should be the specific facts of the case or its overall level
of culpability or heinousness. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the state statutes
have provided guidance on this issue. State courts focus almost exclusively upon factual com-
parisons, although those cases implicitly recognize that factual comparability produces
groups of cases with comparable levels of culpability. The United States Supreme Court's
language, in contrast, suggests that comparisons in terms of culpability and death-worthiness
are its principal concern. The Court has not, however, suggested any way of directly measur-
ing overall case culpability. The two approaches of factual comparison and overall culpabil-
ity, however, do not appear to be mutually exclusive since factual comparisons ultimately go
to the issue of overall case culpability, and estimates of overall culpability intuitively or statis-
tically based are usually tested in terms of factual comparability.
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which the defendant either actively resisted arrest or committed another
crime after the homicide.
We applied the salient factors method to sixty-eight post-Funnan
death sentence cases from Georgia in a manner designed to replicate the
actual comparative sentence reviews of each case by the Georgia
Supreme Court. We selected the salient factors for each of these sixty-
eight cases after reading the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion in the
case, an extensive narrative summary, and a coded questionnaire of the
case.8 7 We then employed a computer to search both the pre- and post-
Furman case files for cases with comparable factors. We excluded from
consideration, however, cases decided after the date of the Georgia
court's decision in the case under review. And, as does the Georgia
court, we limited our search to appealed cases.88 Finally, we aimed in
each of our analyses for a pool of fifteen "similar" cases, the average
number of cases listed in the Georgia court's appendices of similar cases.
87 The 68 cases selected for analysis were 68 of the first 69 death sentence cases affirmed
by the Georgia court under the post-Furman statute.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(o authorizes the Georgia court to examine pre-Furman cases
in its comparative sentence reviews.
88 Approximately one-third of murder convictions at trial were not appealed. Of those
that were appealed, our sample has good coverage. A comparison of our pre-Furman sample
of cases with all murder appeals to the Georgia Supreme Court in which sentence was im-
posed between January 1, 1970 and June 29, 1973 indicates that our sample includes 80% of
the pre-Furman murder appeals. This 20% shortfall is explained (a) by cases in which an ap-
peal was taken but the offender was not committed to the Georgia Department of Corrections
because his original sentence was reversed and he was not subsequently convicted of murder,
and (b) by cases in which the offender was committed to state prison but the name was
inadvertently omitted from the file from which our sample was drawn. Recordkeeping per-
sonnel at the Georgia Department of Offender Rehabilitation believe that very few cases fall
into this latter category.
Our sample also does not include appealed cases in which the jury's sentence was im-
posed between September 29, 1972 (the date of Furman v. Georgia) and March 28, 1973 (the
date of the revised Georgia statute), since juries could not lawfully impose death sentences
during this period. The sample includes, however, unappealed cases in which sentence was
imposed between January 1, 1970 and the date of the Furman decision.
The sample of post-Furman cases is more exhaustive. The 68 post-Furman death sentence
cases that are the subject of our comparative sentence review analysis, see supra notes 43-60
and accompanying text, were decided by the Georgia Supreme Court between March 28,
1973 and December 4, 1979. It includes 95% of the murder cases in which the crime occurred
after March 28, 1973, and there was an appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court which was
decided before December 4, 1979. The court decided 47 (69%) of the analyzed cases before
July 1, 1978 and for the period March 28, 1973 through June 30, 1978, the sample includes
all murder appeals the court decided during this period in cases where the crime occurred
after March 28, 1973. Twenty-one (31%) of the reanalyzed cases were decided between July
1, 1978 and December 4, 1979. For the cases decided during this time period, our sample
includes from 99% of the universe of potentially similar post-Furman cases, for the earliest of
these cases, to 95% of the universe, for the latest case.
The Georgia Supreme Court has limited application of the 1973 death sentencing staute
to cases in which both the crime and the sentence were imposed after the effective date of the
new Act. Akins v. State, 231 Ga. 411, 412, 202 S.E.2d 62, 63 (1973).
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For each group of similar cases thus selected we calculated the death-
sentencing frequency.
(2) The main detenninants method
The main determinants method defines similarity in terms of those
factual characteristics which, in general, appear to influence the sen-
tencing decisions most significantly. One identifies these "main determi-
nants" with a multiple regression analysis. The main determinants
method differs from the salient factors method in two ways. First, when
choosing the similar case selection criteria under the main determinants
method, one substitutes a statistical procedure for the subjective, intui-
tive judgment used to select salient factors. Second, because several of
the main determinant factors are defined more broadly than the salient
factors, the resulting groups of similar cases may be more factually di-
verse than those produced by the salient factors method.
In order to evaluate the Georgia Supreme Court's comparative sen-
tence review of the sixty-eight death sentence cases using the main de-
terminants method, we first conducted a multiple regression analysis of
the capital sentencing decisions by Georgia juries in post-Furman cases.8 9
This procedure identified the following case characteristics as those that
89 The ordinary least squares regression results that guided the selection of the factors
used to subdivide the cases were:
Relative Importance
Standardized of the Variables
Partial According to the
Partial Regression Beta Weights From
Regression Coefficient 1 (most) to 20
Case Characteristics Coefficient (Beta Weight) (least)
I. Defendant
A. Prior Record
1. Number of prior .02 .09 12.5
felony convictions
reported (PRIFEL)







1. Insurance Motive .29 .11 9
(INSMOT)
2. Racial hatred motive .23 .06 18
(RACE)
C. Role in the Crime
1. Two or more victims .20 .13 6
killed by defendant or
co-perpetrator
(TWOVIC)
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most significantly influenced which post-Funman defendants were sen-
tenced to death:
(1) How many people the defendant personally killed (none, one,
or two or more people);
(2) Whether the case involved a serious contemporaneous offense,
i.e., rape, kidnapping, or armed robbery;
Standardized
Partial Relative Importance
Partial Regression of the Variables
Regression Coefficient According to the
Case Characteristics Coefficient (Beta Weight) Beta Weights





1. Victim was police or .15 .07 15.5
fire (VICPFIR)




1. Victim was a stranger .09 .10 10.5
(VICSTRAN)
III. Contemporaneous Offenses
1. Victim was kidnapped .21 .16 2.5
(KIDNAP)
2. Rape involved (RAPE) .24 .14 4
3. Armed robbery involved .13 .16 2.5
(ARMROB)
IV. Method of Killing
1. Multiple shots to head .17 .13 6
(MULSH)
2. Multiple stabs .19 .13 6
(MULSTAB)
3. Victim drowned .14 .06 18
(DROWN)
V. S iAgavatin Factors
u. Nmer of major
aggravating circumstances
in the case .09 .23 1
(MAJAGCRX)
2. Victim a hostage (HOST) .27 .08 14
3. Defendant created great
risk in a public place .06 .06 18
(RPUBPLC
4. Defendant actively
resisted arrest .06 .05 20
(DEFRSARR)
VI. Special Mitigating Factors
1. One or more mitigating -. 06 -. 07 15.5
circumstances (MITCIR)
R 2  .54
All variables were statistically significant beyond the .05 level.
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(3) Whether the case involved one or more of several major aggra-
vating factors;9
(4) Whether the defendant had a felony conviction for, or a record
of, violent personal crimes;
(5) Whether the case involved one or more of several mitigating
factors;9 ' and
(6) Whether the case involved one or more of several minor aggra-
vating factors.
92
On the basis of these main determinants, we divided the post-Furman
sentencing decisions into successively smaller groups of cases that
matched on from one to six of these mitigating and aggravating factors.
We then calculated death sentencing frequencies within each subgroup.
Figure 1 and Appendix B illustrate the results of this procedure.
93
More specifically, Figure 1 presents an overview of the results con-
trolling for (a) the number of victims whom the defendant killed, and
(b) whether there was a serious contemporaneous offense involved in the
case. Each cell in the figure represents a subgroup of similar cases and
indicates the death-sentencing rate for the cases in the subgroup. The
fraction in parentheses beneath the death-sentencing rate indicates (a)
the number of cases in the subgroup sentenced to death (the numera-
tor), and (b) the number of cases in the cell (the denominator). For
example, the top cell in Figure 1, which includes all 607 sentencing deci-
sions in the post-Furman data set, indicates that the death-sentencing
rate for these cases is. 19 (113/607). 94 Figure 1 illustrates how the death-
sentencing rate changes when one introduces controls to account for
90 The major aggravating factors were: Torture, excessive and unnecessary pain, victim
bound and/or gagged, execution-style killing, sexual perversion other than rape, victim pled
for life, defendant showed pleasure with killing, mutilation, slashed throat, defendant an es-
capee, victim was police or fire person, multiple shots to head or multiple stab wounds, insur-
ance motive, or victim was held hostage. The number of these factors present in a case was
the most important variable in the overall regression model (MAJAGCRX), and each factor
alone showed a strong unadjusted association with death-sentencing outcomes. See also infia
note 98.
91 The mitigating factors were: Defendant showed remorse, gave self up within 24 hours,
was drunk or had a history of drug or alcohol abuse, had no intent to kill, believed he or she
had a moral justification, the victim was a fugitive, provoked or aroused defendant, was
drinking, or using drugs or had bad blood with defendant.
92 The minor aggravating factors were: A race-related motive, victim was drowned, de-
fendant resisted arrest, defendant created a great risk in a public place, or the victim was a
hostage or female.
93 For a similar analysis of pre-Furman data from California, see Baldus, Pulaski, Wood-
worth & Kyle, supra note 1, at 54-57.
94 Although there were only 594 cases in the post-Furman data set, 12 of those cases in-
volved one or more death sentences. When the total number of penalty trials related to these
cases are included in the analysis and the unit of observation is the sentencing decision, the
sample size is 607, with 113 death sentences imposed.
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(a) the number of victims whom the defendant personally killed, and
(b) whether there was a serious contemporaneous offense involved. Spe-
cifically, the second row of cells represents three groups of cases in which
(a) the defendant was not the triggerman, (b) the defendant killed one
person, and (c) the defendant killed two or more people. The death-
sentencing rates within these subgroups of cases are .13, .17, and .54,
respectively. The third row of cells further subdivides these cases on the
basis of whether there was a serious contemporaneous offense involved
in the case.
95
Figure 1 also reveals a substantial range of death sentencing rates
among the subgroups of cases, from .03 to .88, and an observable rela-
tionship between these rates and the level of aggravation within each
subgroup. For example, as one reads across the third row of cells in
Figure 1, the death-sentencing rates rise, sometimes dramatically, as one
moves from less to more aggravated cells. Thus, it appears that Georgia
juries and prosecutors clearly responded to the aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors identified as main determinants.
To analyze the sixty-eight death sentence cases in the study, we
located each review case in its respective cell in extensions to Figure 1
and calculated the death-sentencing frequency for that subgroup of
cases, after eliminating non-appealed cases and those decided by the
Georgia court after the date of the case under review.96 Whenever feasi-
ble, we made this calculation for the data in the cells of the extensions to
Figure 1 which control simultaneously for the six main determinants
specified for the analysis. However, when there were fewer than five
cases in one of these cells, we would control for fewer factors in order to
obtain a sample size with at least five similar cases.
For the purposes of this study, we consider the main determinants
method to be a good complement to the salient factors method because
it uses similar case selection criteria that are objective and verifiable.
We do not propose, however, that an appellate court should uncritically
95 As one examines Figure 1, notice that the subgroups of cases become less aggravated as
one reads to the left or down to the left, and more aggravated as one reads to the right or
down to the right. We further subdivided the cases with an extension of Figure 1 which
permitted the simultaneous control for six aggravating and mitigating factors. Appendix B
shows the results for cases involving a single victim. A plain dash "-" within a cell in the
figure indicates there were no cases with that combination of characteristics. Also note that
one can obtain the best insight into the system from subgroups of cases with reasonable sam-
ple size, ie., with at least five cases. Two additional figures, similar to Appendix B, were
created as extensions (a) for cases in which the defendant was not the triggerman, and (b) for
cases in which the defendant killed two or more people.
96 As noted above, the extension for defendants who killed one victim is shown in Appen-
dix B. The extensions for the cases in which the defendant was not the triggerman or killed
two or more people are not shown in this Article.
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employ regression-based selection criteria for identifying similar cases.
9 7
Regression analysis is subject to a variety of weaknesses, one being that
it can only estimate for any given factual characteristic the average im-
pact in all cases. It cannot identify the specific factors that most influ-
enced the jury in any particular death sentence case under review. On
the other hand, we do suggest that understanding the factors that are
generally important to juries may assist a court in trying to identify the
most important factors in any individual case.
(3) The index method
The index method classifies cases as "similar" in terms of a single
criterion-the probability in each case that the defendant will receive a
death sentence. Similar cases are those for which the predicted likeli-
hood of receiving a death sentence is closest to that for the death case
under review. We calculated the predicted likelihood that the defendant
would receive a death sentence for each case by using a multiple regres-
sion analysis of the type previously described.9 8 This procedure not only
97 A State Supreme Court can also identify the factors used to measure overall case culpa-
bility on the basis of its experience and judgment. On the dangers of excessive reliance on
statistical evidence in the conduct of comparative sentence review, see State v. Williams, 308
N.C. 47, -, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355 (1983). The courts' experience in analyzing statistical evi-
dence offered to prove discrimination suggests that they are quite capable of evaluating statis-
tics on the basis of qualitative evidence and their experience and judgment. See Finklestein,
The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 736 (1980).
98 The predictions for each case were based on the combined results of three separate
regression analyses. The first analysis used the 1970-1972 pre-Furman cases and all of the post-
Furman cases that advanced to a penalty trial, to give full coverage to jury decisionmaking.
The second analysis used all the 1970-1972 pre-Furman data and the post-Furman data for
1973-1974, which made the pre- and post-Furman sample sizes about equal. The third analy-
sis used the 1970-1972 pre-Furman data, and the 1973-1975 post-Furman data, which ensured
coverage for equal time periods pre- and post-Furman. We used pre- and post-Furman data
because the Georgia court considers data from both periods in its comparative sentence re-
views. We used the results from three different regression analyses because of the tendency of
each analysis to produce a unique solution which omitted obviously important and relevant
variables. For example, the following variables were omitted from one or more of the models:
Number of Prior Felony Convictions (PRIFEL); Victim a Hostage (HOST); Number of Con-
victions for Murder, Armed Robbery, Rape, Aggravated Battery, Burglary, Arson (VPCX);
Defendant Not the Triggerman (NOKILL); Defendant Created Risk of Death in a Public
Place (PBQB3); and Insurance Motive(INSMOT).
The regression analyses used to produce the predicted likelihood of a death sentence also
included variables for the race of the victim and the race of the defendant. This was done to
increase the validity of the weight assigned to each legitimate aggravating and mitigating
factor underlying the index. These racial factors, however, were not included in the formula
used to give each case its final predicted likelihood of a death sentence. Only legitimate
factors were used for that purpose. See Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. at 2739-41. Also excluded
from the index were variables that did not attain statistical significance at the .10 level and a
handful of legitimate variables for which the regression analysis estimated a regression coeffi-
cient with the wrong sign, ie., the sign of the coefficient was not in the expected direction. An
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identified the factual characteristics that best explained the capital sen-
tencing decisions in the cases we studied, but also weighed the relative
example would be a positive sign for a mitigating factor, which in a rational system would
have a negative effect on a defendant's chances of receiving a death sentence. The rationale
for excluding these apparently irrational variables is the teaching of Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. at 433 n.16, that similar cases should be identified in terms of case characteristics that
are rationally related to the purposes of the death sentencing statute. We selected the vari-
ables used in the index from a list of over 200 variables in a screening procedure that com-
menced with a factor analysis and concluded with an ordinary least squares backward
elimination multiple regression analysis. The results are shown in the table below. The score
for each case was produced with the weights in Column E which are the means of the esti-
mated coefficients in Columns B, C and D.
Weights for
Variables Partial Regression Index
Coefficientsa (EXCSIDX3)
1. Defendant created risk of death in a public
place (PBQ B3)
2. Defendant was minor participant in the
murder (STMIT6)
3. Dispute due to influence of drugs or alcohol
(DRUGDIS)
4. Defendant status sympathetic (MITDEFN)
5. One or more white victims (WHIVICRC)
6. Black Defendant (BLACKD)
7. Number of prior convictions for other
violent personal crimes beyond murder,
armed robbery, rape and kidnapping
(W15D)
8. Insurance motive (INSMOT)
9. Victim was kidnapped (KIDNAP)
10. Rape involved (RAPE)
11. Multiple shots (MULSH)
12. Victim drowned (DROWN)
13. Number of Major aggravating
circumstances (MAJAGCRX)
14. Race hatred motive (RACE)
15. Number of prior felony convictions reported
(PRIFEL)
16. Victim was a stranger (VICSTRAN)
17. Motive to facilitate nonproperty related
crime (NONPCRN)
18. Victim was a hostage (HOST)
19. Number of convictions for murder, armed
robbery, rape, aggravated battery, burglary,
arson (VPCX)
20. Defendant engaged in nonviolent crime
(NONVCOF)
21. Defendant not the triggerman (NOKILL)
22. Number of Georgia statutory death
eligibility factors in case (PEQDELX)
23. Multiple stabs (MULSTAB)
-. 27 .0























.0 .0 .02 .01
.0 .18 .17 .12
.0 .0 .21 .07
.0 .41 .0 .14
.0 .11 .11 .07
.18 .0
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importance of each characteristic. With this information, we computed
a score for each case which reflected the relative likelihood that a de-
fendant would receive a death sentence. We then ranked the cases ac-
24. Two or more victims killed by defendant
and/or co-perpetrator (TWOVICAL) .0 .22 .22 .15
25. Defendant committed additional crime after
killing (ADCRIM) .0 .23 .19 .14
26. Victim low status (VICLSTAT) .0 .0 -. 08 -. 03
R2  .47 .49 .52
a Coefficients are listed if they were statistically significant beyond the. 10 level in a stepwise
regression. A "0" means the variable did not enter the analysis at the .10 level of statistical
significance or beyond.
After each case was assigned an index score, the following scale (AFURSCL2) was created:
If EXCSIDX3 LT -. 05 then AFURSCL2 = 1
If -. 05 LE EXCSIDX3 LT .09 then AFURSCL2 = 2
If .09 LE EXCSIDX3 LT .23 then AFURSCL2 = 3
If .23 LE EXCSIDX3 LT .37 then AFURSCL2 = 4
If .37 LE EXCSIDX3 LT .51 then AFURSCL2 = 5
If .51 LE EXCSIDX3 LT .65 then AFURSCL2 = 6
If .65 LE EXCSIDX3 LT .79 then AFURSCL2 = 7
If EXCSIDX3 GE .79 then AFURSCL2 = 8
We also used logistic regression techniques to construct an alternative index and scale for
evaluating comparative excessiveness. The procedure commenced with approximately 80 le-
gitimate variables that were used in the final screen used to construct the index just described.
The same three pools of pre- and post-Furman data were used to create the regression models
as were employed in the ordinary least squares analyses, and the coefficients were combined
in the same fashion to create the final logistic-based index with the variables that entered one
or more of the analyses at the.10 level of statistical significance. The correlation between the
final logistic-based index and the index created with the ordinary least squares (O.L.S.) pro-
cedure was .85, and the O.L.S. index correlated somewhat better with death-sentencing out-
comes (r = .62 for the O.L.S. index v. r = .56 for the logistic based index).
The following table indicates that the death sentencing frequencies among the different
groups of cases were substantially the same.
Death Sentencing Rates Among Groups of Similar Cases Identified with Indices
and Scales Developed with:
A) ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (O.L.S.), and
B) LOGISTIC REGRESSION PROCEDURES
A B C
Evidence from Index
Predicted Likelihood of and Scale Developed
a Death Sentence Low Evidence from O.L.S. With Logistic Regression
(1) to High (8) Index and Scale Procedures
1 .0 (0/36) .0 (0/3)
2 .0 (0/207) .02 (1/61)
3 .07 (9/136) .02 (4/165)
4 .17 (15/90) .06 (10/166)
5 .36 (19/53) .26 (24/92)
6 .75 (27/36) .64 (30/47)
7 .67 (10/15) .70 (19/27)
8 .97 (33/34) .96 (25/26)
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cording to this index and classified as similar the thirteen cases decided
prior to the date of the death sentence case that ranked immediately
above the review case on the index and the thirteen cases decided prior
to the date of the review case that ranked immediately below it on the
index.99 We then calculated the aggregate death-sentencing frequency
for these twenty-six cases.
A strength of the index method is that it allows one to match cases
simultaneously on the basis of a large number of case characteristics.
The multiple regression procedure permits this result by reducing the
characteristics of all of the aggravating and mitigating factors identified
as important in the regression analysis to a single dimension, the index
score. A drawback of the procedure, however, is the factual differences
that may exist between cases ranked as similar in terms of their respec-
tive index scores. 1° °
Although no court has used this index method for identifying simi-
lar cases in any formal sense, some Georgia Supreme Court justices ap-
pear to use an intuitive method that is quite comparable. As noted
earlier, an analysis of the court's appendices suggests that some justices
compare defendants in capital cases on the basis of their relative culpa-
bility or blameworthiness without regard to the absence of factual simi-
larities.10 1 The court's opinions also suggest that some justices attempt to
assess intuitively the significance of specific factual characteristics in
other cases based upon the decisions of the sentencing juries. For both
of these reasons, we suggest that the manner in which these justices as-
sess the relative culpability of a particular defendant by analyzing the
sentences imposed in other cases roughly approximates the more formal
procedures of this index method.
b. Systemwide measures of comparative excessiveness
Some insight into systemwide excessiveness is provided by aggregat-
ing the results of the analyses we conducted for sixty-eight death sen-
tence cases. We also considered it useful to present an overview of the
99 When there was more than one case with the same index score as the highest or lowest
of the 26 bracketing the subject case, all the cases with the highest or lowest score were in-
cluded in the group of near neighbors. This frequently resulted in more than 26 similar cases.
100 See supra note 84.
101 See supra note 74 and accompanying text for further evidence on the court's use of an
overall culpability method of identifying similar cases.
Multiple regression procedures are commonly used in employment discrimination cases
to determine the extent to which similarly situated people are treated alike. See Finkelstein,
supra note 97; Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 702 (1980).
Although the ultimate issue in a discrimination case (the differential treatment of protected
and unprotected groups and the reasons for the distinctions) is different from the ultimate
issue in comparative proportionality review, the methodological issues involved in defining
groups of similar people are comparable.
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system that embraced all life and death sentence cases without regard to
the date of decision or the presence or absence of an appeal. For the
purposes of conducting this evaluation, we employed four different
methods of identifying similar cases, three based on legislatively pre-
scribed criteria and two based on the factual characteristics which best
explain the actual death-sentencing decisions in a multiple regression
analysis.
(I) Legislative criteria measures
Two of the similar case selection criteria we employed are based on
factors identified as relevant to the sentencing decision by Georgia's
post-Furman capital sentencing statute. These selection criteria classify as
similar:
(1) all cases in which the same statutory aggravating circumstance
is present; 0 2 and
(2) cases in which an equal number of statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances is present.
102 Under the Georgia law, a defendant convicted of murder is eligible for a death sentence
if one or more of the following factors listed in GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534-1 (1983) is present:
B1 Defendant had a prior record of conviction for murder, rape, armed robbery, or
kidnapping with bodily injury.
B2 The defendant was engaged in a contemporaneous murder, rape, armed robbery,
kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated battery, burglary, or arson in the first degree.
B3 The defendant created a great risk of death to two or more people in a public place
with a dangerous weapon.
B4 The defendant's motive was to receive or obtain for himself or another money or any
other thing of monetary value.
B5 The defendant killed a judicial officer or district attorney because of the exercise of
his or her official duty.
B6 The murder was for hire.
B7 The murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim."
B8 The victim was an on-duty police, corrections, or fire person.
B9 The defendant was in custody or an escapee from custody.
B10 The defendant killed to effect his or another's escape from custody or to prevent his
or another's arrest.
For the purposes of this study, the B7 factor "outrageously or wantonly vile" is consid-
ered present in case when one or more of the following conditions exists:
1. Mutilation of the victim before or after death;
2. Death as a result of multiple wounds or contusions;
3. Sexual abuse or perversion, other than rape prior to death, or the victim pled for his
or her life prior to death;
4. Death by severe beating, strangulation, drowning, poisoning, or multiple painful
methods of killing;
5. The contemporaneous existence of rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping with bodily
injury, and a motive to silence a witness, or obtain money, and a) the victim was helpless,
or b) the victim was killed execution-style.
The B7 factors were identified in an analysis of over 50 cases in which the Georgia
Supreme Court ruled on the scope of the B7 aggravating circumstance.
BALDUS, PULASKI, AND WOODWORTH [Vol. 74
Each of these measures is straightforward and easy to understand.
Their validity does not depend on statistical analyses or unverifiable as-
sumptions. They are each limited, however, by their failure to account
for a number of obviously relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.
(2) Regression-based scales
We developed the first regression-based scale from the predicted
sentence index already described, using the cases of all defendants con-
victed of murder at trial during the pre- and post-Furman periods.
10 3
Employing this index, we divided our entire universe of post-Furman
cases into eight groups, clustered according to the predicted likelihood
that the defendants in each would receive a death sentence. We also
developed regression-based scales employing a predicted sentence index
but using only post-Funnan data. 0 4 These scales also grouped the post-
Furman cases according to the likelihood that each defendant convicted
103 For a description of the index underlying this scale, see supra note 98.
104 The results of the regression analysis which used both ordinary least squares (O.L.S.)
and logistic procedures to create the indices and scales were as follows:
Variables
1. Defendant created risk of death in a public
place. (PBQB3)
2. Victim 12 years old or less. (YNQVIC)
3. Defendant was a prisoner or escapee. (PBQB9)
4. Number of prior felony convictions reported.
(PRIFEL)
5. Two or more victims killed by defendant.
(TWOVIC)
6. Defendant not the triggerman. (NOKILL)
7. Victim was police or fire person. (VICPFIR)
8. Victim was a female. (FEMVIC)
9. Victim was a stranger. (VICSTRAN)
10. Victim was kidnapped. (KIDNAP)
11. Rape involved. (RAPE)
12. Armed robbery involved. (ARMROB)
13. Number of aggravating factors. (AGGCIRX)
14. Number of convictions for violent personal
crimes beyond murder, armed robbery, rape
and kidnapping. (Wl5D)
15. Victim a hostage. (HOST)
16. Multiple shots. (MULSH)
17. Victim was drowned. (DROWN)
18. Insurance motive. (INSMOT)
19. Defendant invoked insanity defense. (INSANE)
17. Multiple stabs. (MULSTAB)
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of murder at trial would receive a death sentence. The advantage of
these regression-based measures is that they define similarity in terms of
all of the legitimate aggravating and mitigating factors that help ex-
plain who is sentenced to death. There are, however, dangers in relying
too heavily on a single set of regression results. 05 The principal problem
with the regression-based approaches is the circularity inherent in using
factors identified as the most predictive of the observed results as the
basis for testing the system's consistency. The tendency of multiple re-
gression analyses to generate a unique overfitted solution with respect to
a particular set of decisions compounds this problem.106 The result is
that matches based upon factors identified in this way tend to exagger-
ate the degree of consistency within the system undergoing analysis.
c. Evaluating excessiveness levels
We previously defined a death sentence to be comparatively exces-
sive if other defendants with factually similar backgrounds receive the
death penalty only infrequently for committing factually similar of-
fenses.' 0 7 We base this definition upon the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, which approved of Georgia's compar-
ative sentence review procedure. 08 There is, however, no court opinion
that provides a quantified measure of comparative excessiveness. In
Eberheart v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court approved imposition of
the death penalty in a case involving a non-fatal kidnap-rape, although
only seven of the fourteen "similar" cases cited in its opinion resulted in
22. Defendant actively resisted arrest. -_--a .78
(DEFRSARR)
23. One or more mitigating circumstances. -. 06 -. 52
(MITOIR)
24. Defendant was minor participant in the murder. -. 13 -3.76
(STMIT6)
25. Racial hatred motive. (RACE) .25 2.91
26. Constant Term. -. 06 -6.85
Adjusted R2 = .54
a , means the variable did not enter the analysis at the .10 level of statistical
significance.
The regression analyses are the product of the same type of screening procedure described in
note 98, supra. They include all legitimate variables that entered the analysis at the. 10 level
of statistical significance.
105 See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 273-86 (1980);
Finkelstein, supa note 97; Fisher, supra note 101, for a discussion of threats to validity in
regression results.
106 "Overfitting" refers to the inclusion through chance correlation of extraneous non-
causal variables in a regression equation. A consequence of overfitting is that the results of
the regression analysis may exaggerate the apparent consistency of the system which pro-
duced the data set used to estimate the model.
107 See supra note 1.
108 See supra text accompanying note 42.
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death sentences for similar offense.'0 9 On the other hand, in the earlier
decision of Coley v. State, which also involved a non-fatal rape, the Geor-
gia Supreme Court vacated the death penalty as excessive based upon
the results of twelve other cases involving fourteen defendants, of whom
only thirty-six percent (5/14) received death sentences. 110 Although
these two decisions are by no means conclusive, they suggest that the
Georgia Supreme Court may classify a death sentence as excessive if the
death-sentencing frequency in "similar" cases is somewhat less than
.3511
This suggested approach to a quantified measure of comparative
excessiveness is also consistent with Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in
Gregg v. Georgia. When describing the Georgia Supreme Court's appel-
late review process in death penalty cases as an important statutory safe-
guard, Justice Stewart commented as follows:
The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-sentencing sys-
tem serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty. In particular, the proportionality review substantially elim-
inates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of
an aberrant jury. If a time comes when juries generaly do not impose the death
sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review procedures assure
that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a sen-
tence of death.' 
2
In other words, like the Georgia Supreme Court, Justice Stewart seems
to regard comparative sentence review as a safeguard only against the
type of aberrant, lightning-strike death sentences he condemned in
Furman. 1 3 By contrast, Justice White, in his concurring opinions in
Furman and Gregg, suggested a different approach to the quantification
of comparative excessiveness.
Justice White's Furman opinion expressed concern with the impact
of erratic and infrequent death sentences upon the viability of capital
punishment as a general deterrent. In Justice White's view, the death
penalty could not serve as an effective-and, therefore, constitutional-
deterrent unless imposed "with sufficient frequency."' 14 Similarly, when
109 232 Ga. 247, 206 S.E.2d 12 (1974).
11o 231 Ga. 829, 204 S.E.2d 612 (1974).
111 Complicating this attempt af quantification is Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 213 S.E.2d
829 (1975). In Moore, the Georgia Supreme Court stated, "we view it to be our duty under
the similarity standard to assure that no death sentence is affirmed unless in similar cases
throughout the state the death penalty has been imposed generally .... " Id. at 864, 213
S.E.2d at 832. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court invoked this language to describe the
Georgia procedure in Gregg. 428 U.S. at 205. In fact, however, juries imposed death
sentences in only .39 of the cases identified by the Georgia Supreme Court in Moore as similar.
Nevertheless, the Georgia court affirmed Moore's death sentence because "juries faced with
similar factual situations have imposed death sentences." 233 Ga. at 866, 213 S.E.2d at 833.
112 428 U.S. at 206 (emphasis added).
113 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
114 Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
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concurring in Gregg, Justice White asserted that, if Georgia juries im-
posed the death penalty in "a substantial portion" of capital cases
involving statutory aggravating circumstances, the sanction would
demonstrate its usefulness and, therefore, its constitutionality. 15 Im-
plicit in this deterrence-oriented approach, however, is the notion that,
if the frequency of death sentences within an identifiable class of murder
cases is less than substantial, the constitutional concerns that Justice
White expressed in Furman would remain unsatisfied. In other words,
unless the death penalty is regularly imposed in identifiable classes of
cases, its usefulness as a deterrent remains suspect.
This concern with regularity of imposition, which characterizes Jus-
tice White's concurring opinions, takes on added force when one also
considers the Court's repeated reference to "evenhanded" sentencing in
capital cases as a constitutional goal. In a variety of opinions a number
of different Justices have identified the absence of evenhandedness as
the central defect condemned in Furman v. Georgia. 16 In this respect,
Justice White's concern with regularity in the imposition of the death
penalty is more consistent with the "evenhandedness" mode of analysis
than Justice Stewart's apparent concern with preventing only aberrant
death sentences.
The potential tension between Justice Stewart's notion of what con-
situtes impermissible excessiveness, and that implicit in Justice White's
opinions and the "evenhandedness" approach emerges when one consid-
ers a case like Eberheart v. State . 7 In Eberheart the frequency of death
sentences among cases deemed "similar" by the Georgia Supreme Court
was .50. Certainly, from Justice Stewart's perspective, under these cir-
cumstances Eberheart's own death sentence would not be aberrant.
But, conceivably, Justice White might not regard a .50 death-sentencing
rate as sufficiently regular to make the death penalty in that class of case
a viable deterrent. And, certainly, imposing the death penalty in only
one out of every two factually similar cases does not satisfy the conven-
tional notion of evenhandedness.
As a result, one can plausibly argue that comparatively excessive
death sentences can occur even if the frequency of death sentences
among similar cases is substantially greater than .35. So long as that
frequency is too low to comply with notions of evenhandedness or regu-
larity-something less than .8, for example-one can contend that im-
position of the death penalty in any such case is comparatively excessive.
Obviously, without resolving this potential conflict between Justice
115 428 U.S. at 222.
116 Seesupra note 2.
117 109 Ga. 247, 206 S.E.2d 12 (1974).
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Stewart's "aberrant" approach and the "evenhanded" approach es-
poused by Justice White and other members of the Court, exact quanti-
fication of a measure of excessiveness is impossible. We have not
undertaken that task. Instead, on the basis of this analysis, we have
adopted the convention of classifying death sentences as presumptively
comparatively excessive if the death-sentencing rate among similar cases
is less than .35. If the death-sentencing rate is .80 or greater, we classify
the case as presumptively evenhanded. For cases involving death-sen-
tencing frequencies between those two benchmarks, we adopt no formal
classification. Especially given the tentative nature of our various sys-
tems for identifying other cases as "similar," it seems unnecessary to at-
tempt any more precise quantification of potentially excessive death
sentences.
IV. THE RESULTS
A. THE EVIDENCE OF COMPARATIVE EXCESSIVENESS IN GEORGIA'S
POST-FURMAN DEATH-SENTENCING SYSTEM
In this section we present data on death-sentencing frequencies
under Georgia's post-Funnan statute.
I. Systemwide Measures
Seventeen percent of all defendants convicted of murder at trial
during the period 1973-78 received a death sentence (100/594).118 Of
those convicted defendants who were death-eligible because of the pres-
ence of one or more of the statutory aggravating factors, the death-sen-
tencing rate was .22 (100/463).'19 This death-sentencing rate varied
significantly among the different classes of death-eligible cases, as Table
I indicates. Nevertheless, the rate exceeded .50 in only one small cate-
gory of cases, B-9. In the two statutory categories that accounted for the
major proportion of death sentences, B-2 and B-7, the death-sentencing
rate is well below .50.120 In other words, under Georgia's post-Furman
statute during the period studied, statutorily death-eligible defendants
did not regularly receive the death penalty. Rather, juries and prosecu-
tors continued to exercise considerable discretion and selected only a
relatively few defendants for the ultimate sanction.
118 Some of the trials which occurred in 1978 and 1979 may have been omitted because of
record-keeping delays in the Georgia Department of Offender Rehabilitation.
119 Seesupra note 102 for a listing of the 10 statutory aggravating factors under the Georgia
death sentencing statute.
120 In 85% of the death-sentenced cases in our sample, the sentencing authority found the
B2 or B7 statutory aggravating factor to exist in the case.
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TABLE 1
DEATH SENTENCING RATES FOR DEATH ELIGIBLE DEFENDANTS
UNDER EACH OF GEORGIA'S STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORSa
A B
Georgia Statutory Aggravating Factors Death
Sentencing
Rate
1. Prior capital record .33
(B-1) (13/40)
2. Enumerated contemporaneous offense .34
(B-2) (86/253)
3. Risk of death to 2 or more in public .20
(B-3) (19/94)
4. Money/value motive .36
(B-4) (70/196)
5. Victim/judicial officer b
(B-5)
6. Murder for hire .22
(B-6) (4/18)
7. Murder vile, horrible or inhuman .29
(B-7) (83/288)
8. Victim/police or fire person .31
(B-8) (5/16)
9. Defendant prisoner or escapee .53
(B-9) (9/17)
10. Killing to avoid/stop arrest .31
(B-10) (37/121)
a This measure refers to the presence of a statutory aggravating factor in a case regard-
less of whether it was found by the jury or whether there was even a penalty trial in
the case.
b " means no cases.
Table 2 sheds some light on the factors influencing this exercise of
discretion. Table 2 suggests that the likelihood a defendant would re-
ceive a death sentence increased significantly if his case involved more
than one statutory aggravating factor. Indeed, Georgia juries imposed
seventy-nine percent of the death sentences present in our study against
defendants whose cases involved three or more statutory aggravating
factors. Nevertheless, even for these highly aggravated cases the death-
sentencing rate did not exceed .62.
Table 3 depicts the results from our two regression-based scales.
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Each scale subdivides the cases into eight categories according to the
predicted likelihood of receiving a death sentence. Column B employs a
predicted sentencing index using both pre- and post-Furman cases, while
Column C employs only post-Furman data. As we noted earlier, the re-
sults in Column C probably overstate the degree of consistency of the
TABLE 2
I. DEATH SENTENCING RATES CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER OF
GEORGIA STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS PRESENTa
A



















II. NUMBER AND PROPORTION OF DEATH SENTENCE CASES FOR
WHICH THE DEATH SENTENCING FREQUENCY
IN SIMILAR CASES WAS:
A. Less than .35 .21
(21/100)
B. .80 or More .0
(0/100)
a This measure refers to the number of statutory aggravating factors in the case regard-
less of whether they were found by the jury or even whether there was a penalty trial
in the case.
b The correlation coefficient between the death sentencing rate and the number of stat-
utory aggravating factors in the case is .49.
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TABLE 3
I. DEATH SENTENCING RATES CONTROLLING FOR THE PREDICTED














































II. NUMBER AND PROPORTION OF DEATH SENTENCE CASES FOR
WHICH THE DEATH SENTENCE FREQUENCY IN SIMILAR CASES WAS:
A. Less than .35 .38 .26
(38/100) (26/100)
B. .80 or More .26 .40
(26/100) (40/100)
a See supra note 98 and accompanying text for an explanation of how this index and
scale were created. The correlation between this index and the death sentencing out-
come among the post-Furman cases is .67.
b See supra note 104 and accompanying text for an explanation of how this index and
scale were created. The correlation between this index and the death sentencing out-
come among the post-Furman cases is .75.
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system. 121 Nevertheless, even these results suggest that twenty-six per-
cent of the death sentences covered in our study occurred in cases with a
predicted death-sentencing rate, based upon the results in similar cases,
of less than .35. The results in Column B, which may be more realistic,
indicate that only twenty-six percent of the defendants who actually re-
ceived death sentences committed crimes for which the predicted death-
sentencing rate exceeded .80.
The data reflected in Tables 2 and 3 belie any suggestion that
Georgia's post-Furman capital sentencing statute operated in a com-
pletely random fashion. In particular, the frequency with which juries
imposed the death penalty increased with the number of statutory ag-
gravating factors. Nevertheless, the death-sentencing rates observed
among cases defined as similar in terms of the statutory aggravating fac-
tors appear to be well below the rates that the United States Supreme
Court contemplated in Gregg v. Georgia. 122 Only among the most aggra-
vated cases in our regression-based scales does one observe the kind of
high death-sentencing rates that the Supreme Court expected would re-
sult in death-eligible cases generally.
Thus, despite enactment of Georgia's post-Funnan statute with its
legislatively identified categories of death-eligible offenses, the question
of comparative excessiveness remains unresolved. When a majority of
death-eligible defendants do not receive a death sentence, the even-
handedness of the process by which a relatively few defendants do re-
ceive death sentences remains in doubt. Thus, the efficacy of the
Georgia Supreme Court's system of comparative sentence review-the
121 See supra note 106 for further discussion of this issue. The post-Furman scale based on a
logistic regression analysis produced death sentencing figures that were comparable to those
produced with the index and scale constructed from an ordinary least squares analysis. The
results from the logistic based scale were as follows:
Level of Predicted Likelihood of a death sentence,
from low (1) to high (8)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Proportion of Death Sentences (life/death cases)
0 .01 0 .12 .27 .58 .77 1.0
(0/41) (1/177) (0/138) (12/103) (1 1/41) (15/26) (24/31) (37/37)
Overall the logistic based measure suggested that in 24% (24/100) of the death sentence cases
the death-sentencing frequency among similar cases was less than .35 and in 37% (37/100) of
the cases the death-sentencing frequency among similar cases was .80 or more.
Both the O.L.S. and logistic regression analysis based on the post-Furman data were
limited to variables that demonstrated a statistically significant relationship with the outcome
variable beyond the. 10 level and revealed a coefficient whose sign was in expected direction.
The rationale for excluding variables with a "wrong" sign is presented in note 98, supra.
122 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 224 (White, J., concurring), for evidence of Justice
White's assumption about the frequency with which death sentences would be imposed in
death-eligible cases. We assume this expectation was shared by the Court generally.
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key safeguard against excessive or inconsistent death sentences-be-
comes critical.
2. Case Specific Measures
Among our case specific measures of comparative excessiveness, we
consider the salient factors method the most relevant because it most
closely approximates how the Georgia court purports to review death
sentences.' 23 We applied this method to sixty-eight cases in which the
Georgia court had earlier conducted a comparative sentence review. 124
For each case we identified a group of cases deemed similar to the death
case under review in terms of an average of 3.6 salient factors and calcu-
lated the death-sentencing rate among the cases selected.125 The aver-
age death-sentencing rate among similar cases was .46. Figure 2 shows a
distribution of the death-sentencing frequencies among similar cases for
the sixty-eight cases. The horizontal axis indicates the proportions of
death sentences found among the various groups of similar cases, while
the vertical axis indicates the number of cases from our pool of sixty-
eight death sentence cases with that death-sentencing frequency among
similar cases. For example, the farthest bar to the right indicates that in
four of the cases reanalyzed, all of the similar cases resulted in a death
sentence. The data in Figure 2 indicate that, in twenty-five percent
(17/68) of the sixty-eight death sentence cases we studied, the death-
sentencing rate among similar cases was less than .35; and that in only
10 percent (7/68) of the cases studied did it exceed .80.
When we selected similar cases on the basis of those factors our
regression analyses identified as most important, the death-sentencing
rates among similar cases increased considerably. Figure 3 shows the
results of these analyses using the main determinants and index meth-
ods.' 26 The results we derived using the index method reflected the
123 See supra notes 44-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Georgia Supreme
Court's purported method of reviewing death cases. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the salient factors method generally.
124 See supra note 87-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the universe of cases in
which each search was conducted.
125 The number of salient factors matched on in the 68 reanalyses ranged from one to six
and the number of similar cases identified ranged from 4 to 32. The smaller pools of similar
cases were from the early cases for which the pool of potentially similar cases was quite small.
126 For the analysis using the main determinants method, the number of matching factors
ranged from one to six and the number of cases deemed similar ranged from 5 to 24. For the
index measure the number of cases deemed similar ranged from 25 to 38. See supra note 89
and accompanying text for a discussion of the main determinants approach. See supra note 98
and accompanying text for a discussion of the index method.
We also conducted a case-by-case analysis with an index based only on the post-Funnan
data. The index was a forerunner of the one described supra note 104 and correlated with the
latter index at .92. In that analysis, 13 (9/68) of the cases showed a death-sentencing fre-
quency below .35 among similar cases and 40% (27/68) showed a rate of .80 or higher.
BALDUS, PULASKI, AND WOOD WORTH [Vol. 74
FIGURE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF 68 DEATH SENTENCE CASES REANALYZED WITH
THE SALIENT FACTORS METHOD OF IDENTIFYING SIMILAR CASES
ACCORDING TO THE PROPORTION OF DEATH SENTENCE CASES
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Proportion of Death Sentence Cases Among Cases Deemed Similar'
I Except for .0 and 1.0, points on the scale include cases with the proportion indicated plus
cases immediately above the next lower point on the scale, e.g., the bar at .50 represents
cases with death sentencing frequencies among similar cases ranging from more than .45
to and including .50.
greatest level of consistency or evenhandedness. The average death-sen-
tencing frequency among all cases selected as similar by the index
method was .68. Moreover, when analyzed using this method, half of
the sixty-eight death sentence cases in our study (34/68) qualified as
presumptively evenhanded in that the death-sentencing frequency
among similar cases exceeded .80. By contrast, only thirteen percent
(9/68) qualified as presumptively excessive, using our frequency bench-
mark of less than .35. The results we derived when using the main de-
terminants matching method for selecting similar cases were less
impressive. The average death-sentencing frequency among all cases
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FIGURE 3
DISTRIBUTIONS OF DEATH SENTENCE CASES REANALYZED WITH
Two METHODS OF IDENTIFYING SIMILAR CASES ACCORDING TO THE
PROPORTION OF DEATH SENTENCE CASES AMONG CASES DEEMED
SIMILAR TO THE DEATH SENTENCE CASE UNDER REVIEW
I. INDEX METHOD
FREQUENCY
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Proportion of Death Sentence Cases Among Cases Deemed Similar*
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Frequencies could not be calculated for four cases because of inadequate sample size.
Except for .0 and 1.0, points on the scale include cases with the proportion indicated plus
cases immediately above the next lower point on the scale, e.g., the bar at .50 represents
cases with death sentencing frequencies among similar cases ranging from more than .45
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selected as similar by this method was .58. Furthermore, using this
method, only thirty percent of the death sentence cases included in the
study qualified as presumptively evenhanded (19/64), while twenty-two
percent (14/64) qualified as presumptively excessive.
B. THE SOURCES OF COMPARATIVE EXCESSIVENESS
There appear to be two principal explanations for Georgia's gener-
ally low death-sentencing rates. The first is that prosecutors do not rou-
tinely seek death sentences in death-eligible cases. In fact, in only forty
percent of the cases in which the jury convicted the defendant of a mur-
der involving a statutory aggravating circumstance did the prosecution
even seek a death sentence. 127 Although the Georgia statute states that
there "shall" be a penalty trial in all cases resulting in a murder convic-
tion, in practice a penalty trial will not occur unless the prosecution so
requests. 128 The impact of this exercise of prosecutorial discretion to
forego a penalty trial is enormous. When penalty trials do occur, Geor-
gia juries impose death sentences in fifty-five percent of the cases; among
127 As the data in Table 4 below indicate, however, there is a strong correlation between
the rate at which penalty trials are held and the seriousness of the cases.
TABLE 4
RATES AT WHICH CASES ADVANCE TO A PENALTY TRIAL, CONTROLLING FOR THE
NUMBER OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS AND THE PREDICTED LIKELIHOOD OF A
DEATH SENTENCE
A B C D
Number of Statutory Penalty Predicted Likelihood of Penalty
Aggravating Factors Trial a Death Sentence from 1 Trial
in the Casesa Rate (low) to 8 (high)b Rate
0 .06 1 .03
(8/132) (1/36)
1 .11 2 .11
(17/150) (22/207)
2 .35 3 .23
(47/136) (31/136)
3 .63 4 .49
(62/99) (43/87)
4 .73 5 .49
(45/62) (25/51)
5 .77 6 .86
(10/13) (30/35)




a The correlation between this measure and the penalty trial rate is .52.
b See supra note 98 and accompanying text for an explanation of how this index and
scale were created. The correlation between this measure and the penalty trial rate is
.56.
128 See supra note 56.
1983] COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF DEATH SENTENCES 707
the more aggravated cases the death-sentencing rates are particularly
high. 1
29
Georgia's relatively low overall post-Funnan death-sentencing rate
also reflects a very low death-sentencing rate in black victim cases.' 30
129 Table 5 below presents death-sentencing rates at penalty trial controlling for the
number of statutory aggravating factors and the predicted likelihood of a death sentence.
TABLE 5
I. Penalty Trial Death Sentencing Rates Controlling for the Number of Statutory



























from 1 (low) to 8 (high)b
II. Number and Proportion of Death Sentence Cases for Which the Death Sentencing
Frequency in Similar Cases was:
A. Less than .35









a The correlation between this measure and the penalty trial death sentencing rate is .40.
b See supra note 98 and accompanying text for an explanation of how this index was
created.
130 Three measures of race-of-victim disparities among cases resulting in a murder convic-
tion at trial are shown in Table 6. Because black victim cases constitute 40% of the cases in
the sample, the very low death-sentencing rate among those cases draws down the overall
rate. We also measured the overall race of victim disparity with an O.L.S. regression analysis
which controlled simultaneously for over 150 aggravating and mitigating factors, and the
defendants age, sex, race and socio-economic status. The race of victim coefficient in the
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Specifically, the rate is .06 (15/246) for black victim cases versus .24
(85/348) for white victim cases. This disparity is particularly apparent
when prosecutors are deciding whether to seek a death sentence, and its
effect persists after one adjusts for the aggravation level of different
cases.1 3 1 In other words, our data strongly suggests that Georgia is oper-
131 Table 6A presents the race-of-victim disparities in prosecutorial decision-making con-
trolling for the number of statutory aggravating factors.
TABLE 6A
RACE OF VIcTIM DISPARITIES IN PROSECUTORIAL DEcISIONMAKING




Statutory White Black Penalty Trial Ratio Penalty
Aggravating Victim Victim Rates Trial Rates
Factors Rate Rate (Col.B-Col.C)a (Col.B-Col.C)
0 .13 .01 .12* 13.00
(7/56) (1/76)
1 .17 .06 .11 2.83
(13/78) (4/72)
2 .39 .28 .11 1.39
(31/79) (16/57)
3 .74 .39 .35** 1.90
(50/68) (12/31)
4 .81 .22 .59** 3.68
(43/53) (2/9)
5 or 6 .71 1.00 -. 29 .71
(10/14) (1/1)
*Statistically significant beyond the .05 level.
**Statistically significant beyond the .01 level.
a The overall race-of-victim disparity was. 17, statistically significant at the .0001 level.
We also measured race-of-victim disparities in prosecutorial decisionmaking after con-
trolling for several other combinations of nonracial background factors. We created an index
of legitimate variables statistically significant at the. 10 level with ordinary least squares pro-
cedures, using the decision to conduct a penalty trial hearing as the outcome variable; the
index was also limited to variables whose coefficients were in the expected direction as ex-
plained supra note 98. When this index was controlled for, along with the race of defendant,
the ordinary least squares coefficient was .12, statistically significant at the .001 level. The
logistic regression coefficient was 1.02, significant at the .002 level, suggesting that the odds of
having a penalty trial are 2.7 times higher if the defendant's victim is white. We also created
indices using logistic regression procedures, with and without perverse variables. The results
were comparable, producing ordinary least square coefficients of .15 (P = .001) and .16 (P =
.00 1) and logistic coefficients producing enhanced odds of having a penalty trial on the order
2.7 (P = .001) and 3.2 (P = .001) times. We also conducted a large scale ordinary least
squares (O.L.S.) regression analysis which controlled simultaneously for over 150 aggravating
and mitigating background facts, and the age, sex, race, and socio-economic status of the
defendant. The race-of-victim coefficient in the analysis was .12 statistically significant at the
.01 level. When we controlled for all 10 statutory aggravating circumstances, a prior record
variable, and 80 mitigating factors, the race-of-victim coefficient was .10, significant at the
.001 level. When we controlled simultaneously for over 200 legitimate and suspect back-
ground factors, the race-of-victim coefficient dropped to .11, significant at the .15 level.
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ating a dual system, based upon the race of the victim, for processing
homicide cases. Georgia juries appear to tolerate greater levels of aggra-
vation without imposing the death penalty in black victim cases; 132 and,
as compared to white victim cases, the level of aggravation in black vic-
tim cases must be substantially greater before the prosecutor will even
seek a death sentence.
C. COMPARATIVE SENTENCE REVIEW IN THE GEORGIA SUPREME
COURT
The United States Supreme Court asserted in Gregg v. Georgia that
When the analysis was limited to variables that were statistically significant at the .10 level,
the coefficient for the race-of-victim variable was .13, significant at the .0001 level. The lead-
ing source of the race-of-victim disparities in Georgia's death-sentencing system for defend-
ants convicted of murder at trial is clearly the decision to advance the case to a penalty trial.
132 Table 7 presents the race-of-victim disparties in jury decisionmaking controlling for the
number of statutory aggravating factors.
TABLE 7
RAcE-oF-VICTIM DISPARITIES IN JURY DECISIONMAKING




Statutory White Black Difference Death- Ratio Death-
Aggravating Victim Victim Sentencing Rates Sentencing Rates
Factors Rate Rate (Col.B-Col.C)a (Col.B/Col.C)
.00 .00
0 (0/7) (0/1) 0
.36 .25
1 (5/14) (1/4) .11 1.44
.31 .47
2 (10/32) (8/17) -. 16 .66
.64 .50
3 (34/53) (6/12) .14 1.28
.78 .50
4 (38/49) (1/2) .28 1.56
.91 .00
5 or 6 (10/11) (0/1) .91
a The overall race-of-victim disparity was .05, statistically significant at the .59 level.
We also measured race-of-victim effects in jury sentencing decisionmaking with ordinary
least squares (O.L.S.) and logistic regression analyses. In an O.L.S. analysis which controlled
simultaneously all statutory aggravating circumstances, some 50 mitigating factors and the
race of defendant, the race-of-victim coefficient was .22 (significant at the .04 level); in a
stepwise regression analysis which included the statistically significant (< 10) aggravating and
mitigating factors selected from a list of over 150 variables the race-of-victim coefficient was
.06, significant at the .42 level. Logistic analysis with smaller sets of the most important non-
racial background variables showed slightly enhanced odds of receiving a death sentence in
white victim cases (by factors of from 1.2 to 1.8), although none of these disparities achieved
statistical significance beyond the .10 level. These results indicate that statewide, a race-of-
victim effect is perceivable but weak.
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the Georgia Supreme Court's system of comparative sentence review en-
sured that defendants would be protected against arbitrary, capricious,
or discriminatory death sentences. Since 1973, the Georgia court has
conducted comparative sentence reviews in over 120 death penalty
cases, including the sixty-eight cases included in this study. In only two
of these 120 cases, however, has the Georgia court vacated death
sentences on the grounds that they were "excessive or disproportionate."
Moreover, in neither of these two cases did the court vacate the death
sentence because of the rare or infrequent imposition of that penalty in
similar cases. In one case the jury had resentenced to death a defendant
who had previously received a life sentence; 133 in the other, the defend-
ant's coperpetrator, the actual triggerman, had received only a life sen-
tence.' 34 In every other case, including the sixty-eight cases included in
our study, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence as
neither excessive nor disproportionate.
This fact alone, however, does not suggest that the Georgia court's
comparative review process is in any way defective. The results of that
review process are quite proper if the cases cited in the appendices to the
court's opinions in the sixty-eight death sentence cases in our study were
the proper cases to consider for comparative sentence review. Figure 4
depicts the distribution of death-sentencing frequencies among these ap-
pendix cases. It indicates that for eighty-eight percent of these cases,
(60/68), every case cited as similar in the court's appendices was a death
sentence case. For only five of these sixty-eight cases was the death-
sentencing rate among the appendix cases less than .75; and for only one
case was it under .50.135 The issue, however, is whether the cases that
133 Ward v. State, 239 Ga. 205, 208-09, 236 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1977). The decision drew an
interesting dissent in which Justice Bowles argued that all similar cases, not just the defend-
ant's prior case, should have been considered on the issue of disproportionality. The rule of
the Georgia Supreme Court in Ward was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 437 (1981), on the ground that the double jeopardy
clause prevented imposition of a death sentence upon retrial when a jury had imposed life
imprisonment at the first trial.
134 Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252, 244 S.E.2d 833 (1978). The Georgia court has not, however,
established aper se rule to the effect that a death sentence is disproportionate in all cases in
which coperpetrators receive life sentences. The question turns upon who the triggerman was,
how clear it was who the triggerman was, and whether the coperpetrator who received less
than a death sentence did so at a penalty trial, or by way of a plea bargain, or up on the basis
of other distinguishing characteristics. See also Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 707-08, 273 S.E.2d
124, 134 (1980); Baker v. State, 243 Ga. 710, 712-13, 257 S.E.2d 192, 194 (1979); Hill v. State,
237 Ga. 794, 801-03, 229 S.E.2d 737, 742-43 (1976).
In both Ward and Hall, the court appears to have been applying a concept of intra-case
proportionality that rests upon a notion of fairness that goes beyond the concept underlying
the prohibition against excessive and disporportionate death sentences generally. No reason
is given in either case for the deviation from the more general approach except a concept of
"equal justice" in the treatment of offenders in a single crime.
135 See supra notes 107-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of how infrequently
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FIGURE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF 68 DEATH SENTENCE CASES REVIEWED BY THE
GEORGIA SUPREME COURT FOR EXcESSIvENESS OR DISPROPORTION-
ALITY ACCORDING TO THE PROPORTION OF DEATH SENTENCED
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lected as "similar" when reviewing death penalty cases are, in fact, the
cases it should consider when conducting such comparative sentence
reviews.
D. EVALUATION
A comparison of the results of our analyses of the sixty-eight death
sentence cases in our study with the Georgia Supreme Court's failure to
find that even one of those sixty-eight death sentences was compara-
tively excessive strongly suggests that Georgia's sentence review process
does not function as the Court in Gregg v. Georgia assumed. We make
this statement cautiously, however, since its accuracy depends on the
validity of our measures of comparative excessiveness. A possibility does
death sentences must be imposed among similar cases to constitute excessiveness in a compar-
ative sense.
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exist that the observed disparity between the Georgia court's record and
our findings has simply resulted from our use of inaccurate or inappro-
priate measures. As previously noted, the critical feature of any system
of comparative sentence review is the process of selecting the cases
deemed to be "similar" to the death sentence case under review. As we
have also noted, none of the computer-assisted methods we have em-
ployed for that purpose is foolproof. An examination of those special,
nonquantifiable features of any case we cannot include in our computer-
ized data files may change our results.
We consider this prospect unlikely, however. Our data files include
every factor that the Georgia Supreme Court has identified as salient in
any of its opinions. We also doubt that the Georgia Supreme Court has
reached different conclusions about the degree of excessiveness involved
in any particular case from those indicated by our results on the basis of
obscure or unquantifiable factual distinctions. Certainly, the court's
opinions have never invoked any idiosyncratic features of the death sen-
tence cases under review that were not apparent from the face of the
record or did not appear in our list of variables.
It is more likely, we believe, that the discrepancies between our
findings and the court's sentence review decisions have resulted from the
manner in which the court conducts the sentence review process. There
are several aspects of the court's similar case selection procedures that
could contribute to this disparity in results, each of which we discuss
later in this Article. We consider first, however, an alternate hypothesis:
that the Georgia Supreme Court conducts a defacto sentence review in
death penalty cases by reversing on procedural grounds death sentences
it considers to be comparatively excessive.
1. The De Facto Review Hypothesis
The Georgia Supreme Court has never vacated a death sentence in
a murder case because of the infrequency of death sentences in similar
cases. There is a possibility, however, that the court in effect conducts a
defacto comparative sentence review by reversing death sentences it re-
gards as excessive on procedural grounds.13 6 The court vacates on pro-
cedural grounds approximately twenty percent of the death sentences it
reviews, either by reversing the underlying murder conviction or vacat-
ing the death sentence for procedural error affecting the penalty trial. It
is possible, therefore, for institutional or other reasons, that the court
136 The hypothesis was suggested by Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68
GEO. L.J. 97, 118 (1979) (the court may be using "procedural defects to justify the reversal of
death sentences that it finds offensive for unarticulated but more 'substantive' reasons").
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only engages in a formal comparative sentence review in cases it believes
are clearly not excessive or disproportionate in a comparative sense.
TABLE 8
RATES AT WHICH DEATH SENTENCES ARE VACATED ON APPEAL ON
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS, CONTROLLING FOR THE PREDICTED LIKELI-
HOOD OF A DEATH SENTENCE
A B
Predicted Likelihood of a Death Sentence from 3 Reversal







a See supra note 98 and accompanying text for a description of the index underlying
this scale. Levels 1 & 2 are omitted from the scale because no death sentences were
imposed among cases at those levels.
If this hypothesis were true, one would expect to see higher rates of
reversal on procedural grounds among the less aggravated death sen-
tence cases.1 37 Table 8 depicts the reversal for death sentence cases at
different levels of aggravation. Except between levels six and seven the
reversal rate generally declines as the cases become more aggravated:
among the most aggravated cases, the reversal rate is approximately
one-half that observed among the least aggravated cases. 138
Table 9 depicts the extent to which the procedural reversals of
death sentences have reduced the level of excessiveness in the system, as
137 This expectation rests upon the assumption that a death sentence in a less aggravated
class of cases is more likely to be comparatively excessive.
138 It should be noted, however, that between categories three, four, and five on the index-
based scale there were four death sentences imposed by a jury which were changed to life
sentences at the trial level, and the case was not appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. We
can only surmise that concerns about excessiveness influenced those decisions. Since the data
in Table 8 are limited to cases that were appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, the impact
of those decisions is not reflected in Table 8.
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estimated with an index measure. Columns B and C indicate the
number and proportion of death sentence cases before and after appel-
late review at each aggravation level. Of particular interest are the
death sentence cases included in levels three to five for which the death-
sentencing frequency is less than .35. Column B indicates that there
were originally thirty-eight death sentence cases in this potentially ex-
cessive category. Column D indicates, however, that the Georgia
Supreme Court reversed fifteen of these cases on procedural grounds,
reducing the size of the group by thirty-nine percent.
TABLE 9
DEATH-SENTENCING RATES AMONG GROUPS OF SIMILAR CASES
BEFORE AND AFTER APPELLATE REVIEW
A B C D
Reduction In the
Number of
Predicted Likelihood of Death Cases
Receiving a Death After Appellate
Sentence from 3 Before After Review
(lowest) to 8 (highest)a Review Review (Col.B-Col.C)
3 .07 (9/136) .03 (4/131) 5
4 .14 (12/87) .09 (7/82) 5
5 .33 (17/51) .26 (12/46) 5
6 .74 (26/35) .72 (23/32) 3
7 .67 (10/15) .62 (8/13) 2
8 .96 (26/27) .95 (20/21) 6
a See supra note 98 and accompanying text for a description of the index underlying
this scale. Levels 1 & 2 are omitted from the scale because no death sentences were
imposed among cases at those levels.
Thus, our data provide some support for the hypothesis that the
Georgia court conducts defacto comparative sentence reviews by vacat-
ing excessive death sentences on procedural grounds. Certainly, by
these decisions the court has eliminated a not insubstantial portion of
the death sentences which our measures suggest may be comparatively
excessive. On the other hand, it also seems likely that the Georgia
Supreme Court's appellate review processes has left untouched a sub-
stantial number of cases which may be excessive. We believe these cases
remain uncorrected because of certain institutional features of the Geor-
gia Supreme Court's procedures for selecting "similar" cases. We now
address whether comparatively excessive death sentencing persists de-
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spite the Georgia Supreme Court's appellate review, and we examine
certain policies that the Georgia court has apparently adopted that may
contribute to that result.
2. The Death Case Bias Hypothesis
Despite the statutory requirement of comparative sentence review,
the Georgia Supreme Court does not vacate on excessiveness grounds
death sentences which our measures identify as questionable. This dis-
crepancy in results occurs because the Georgia court selects as "similar"
different cases from those identified by our measures. One possible ex-
planation for this variation is that there is a death case bias in the
court's method for identifying similar cases. To test this hypothesis, we
calculated the rates at which the Georgia court included life and death
cases from pools of presumptively similar cases in its appendices. We
then compared those rates with the rates at which our three alternative
measures selected life and death cases as similar from the same pools of
presumptively similar cases.
We conducted a separate analysis for each of the sixty-eight death
sentence cases included in our study. We constructed a pool of pre-
sumptively similar cases for each of these sixty-eight cases by combining
the cases identified as similar by the court in its appendices with the
cases our three alternative measures identified as similar; we gave each
case identified as similar by any method equal weight.139
In order to test the Georgia Supreme Court's appendix cases for a
death case bias, we began with the assumption that any unbiased
method of identifying similar cases is as likely to overlook comparable
life sentence cases as comparable death sentence cases. If the method
operates without a systematic bias, its tendency disproportionately to
select either death or life sentence cases should vary from case to case in
a random fashion.'
40
Thus, for each of the sixty-eight death sentence cases in our study,
we calculated the extent to which the court's appendix cases and those
139 Our analysis, however, deviated from the procedure used by the court in the following
particulars: (1) our universe of potentially similar cases was somewhat smaller than that con-
sidered by the court, see supra note 88, and (2) the analysis conducted with the fact-specific
main determinants measure included as potentially similar cases only post-Furnan decisions.
The analysis of the pre-Furman case hypothesis suggests that the exclusion of the pre-Furman
cases from the universe of potentially similar cases has little impact on the results. See infra
note 155 and accompanying text.
14 This is the same assumption relied on by courts when analyzing claims of systemwide
discriminations. When choosing among similarly situated employees or jurors of different
races or sexes, it is to be assumed that in certain cases random factors will result in an overrep-
resentation of women or minorities and in other cases underrepresentation of women and
minorities, but that the degree of over and underselection of the two groups should be ran-
domly distributed. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 105, at 287-32 1.
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selected by our alternative methods tended disproportionately to select
as similar life sentence or death sentence cases. We measured selection
bias by the difference between the rates at which a given method se-
lected life sentence and death sentence cases from this pool. For exam-
ple, assume that, for a given death sentence case, the pool of
presumptively similar cases consists of twenty death cases and thirty life
cases. If a particular selection method, the main determinants method,
for example, identified as similar ten death cases and ten life cases, the
selection rate for death sentence cases would be .50 (10/20), and the rate
for the life cases would be .33 (10/30). Thus, for this case the main
determinants method overselected death cases by a margin of .17 (.50
rate for death cases, .33 rate for life cases). For each of the sixty-eight
cases we used this method to determine the rates at which the court
overselected death and life cases as similar; we made similar computa-
tions for each of our three alternative methods. Thus, for each of the
sixty-eight cases we derived a set of four disparities, each reflecting the
rates at which different selection methods identified life and death cases
as similar.
Table 10 shows the results.141 They indicate that the Georgia
Supreme Court has a strong tendency to overselect death sentence cases.
In fact, the Georgia Supreme Court selected as "similar" only one case
decided under the post-Funnan statute in which the defendant received a
life sentence. Interestingly, Table 10 suggests that the salient factors
method, which the court most regularly purports to use, possesses a
moderate bias in favor of life sentence cases.
Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of the disparities summarized in
Table 10. For example, panel I of Figure 5 shows the number of times
death cases were favored over life cases and the degree of the bias for
each of the court's appendix cases. The disparities produced by the two
index-related measures, illustrated in panels III and IV, show a fairly
random pattern of disparities; there are about as many groups of similar
cases in which life cases are overrepresented as there are overrepresenta-
tions of death sentence cases. These panels illustrate exactly the kind of
distribution one would expect from an unbiased selection procedure.
The distribution for the salient factors method (panel II) shows a slight
141 The results in Table 10 should be viewed as only suggestive, since the sizes of the pools
of similar cases selected by each method are not the same. The largest groups of similar cases
were selected by the index method (average 26) followed by the Georgia court's appendices
(average 15), the salient feature method (average 14), and the fact-specific main determinants
method (average 9). To the extent that a particular method identifies a very large number of
cases as similar, it increases the likelihood that other methods will also identify as similar the
cases it selected.
BALDUS, PULASKI, AND WOOD WORTH
TABLE 10
AVERAGE DISPARITY IN THE RATES AT WHICH DEATH SENTENCE
AND LIFE SENTENCE CASES ARE IDENTIFIED AS SIMILAR FOR
PURPOSES OF COMPARATIVE SENTENCE REVIEWa
Average Disparity in Selection Rates
Method (Death Case Rate-Life Case Rate)
Georgia Supreme Court .42
Method as Reflected in
Appendix Cases
Index Method .14
Main Determinants Method -. 10
Salient Factors Method -. 24
a N=68
bias in favor of life cases, and the distribution for the appendix cases
(panel I) shows a strong bias toward the overselection of death cases.
What is most compelling, however, is the failure of the Georgia Supreme
Court's appendix cases to overselect life sentence cases with respect to
even one of the sixty-eight death sentence cases in our study.
Finally, we compared the identity of the cases selected as similar by
the court and the alternative methods. The results do not suggest that
the Georgia court is working with an entirely different universe of po-
tentially similar cases from that identified by our alternate methods. In-
deed, the court has identified as "similar" many of the same death
sentence cases selected by our alternative methods. The court, however,
systematically overlooks the life sentence cases identified as similar by
our alternative methods.
3. Possible Sources of Death Case Bias
The results of our analyses suggest that the Georgia court's sentence
review process is systematically biased towards overselecting cases in
which the jury imposed a death sentence as "similar." As a conse-
quence, no death sentence reviewed by the court appears to be excessive.
There are several possible explanations for the Georgia court's predispo-
sition to overselect death sentence cases, each of which we attempted to
evaluate.
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FIGURE 5
FOUR DISTRIBUTIONS OF 68 DEATH SENTENCE CASES REVIEWED BY
THE GEORGIA COURT FOR COMPARATIVE EXCESSIVENESS ACCORD-
ING TO THE DEGREE OF BIAS REFLECTED IN THE CASES IDENTIFIED
AS SIMILAR BY THE GEORGIA COURT AND THREE ALTERNATIVE
METHODS OF IDENTIFYING SIMILAR CASES FOR COMPARATIVE
SENTENCE REVIEW
(Values along the horizontal axis of each figure indicate the degree to
which death (+) or life (-) cases were disproportionately represented
among the cases identified as similar)-
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a. A precedent-seeking approach to proportionality review
One possible explanation is that the Georgia Supreme Court fre-
quently uses a precedent-seeking form of sentence review and is satisfied,
on the basis of even a few "similar" death sentence cases, that the death
sentence in a particular case is reasonable. The principal evidence sup-
porting this hypothesis is the small number of life sentence cases listed in
the court's appendices as "similar." In only seven of the sixty-eight
death sentence cases in our study did the court's opinion identify a life
sentence case as "similar."
One can readily understand why a court might employ a prece-
dent-seeking approach to sentence review. Collecting and systemati-
cally analyzing data case-by-case can be a complex, time-consuming
process. Moreover, except when a death sentence is clearly excessive,
the process may involve difficult questions of interpretation for which
there is little guidance. 142 The precedent-seeking approach is easier to
apply and may avoid hard legal issues. 143 Furthermore, in comparison
to the frequency approach characteristic of true comparative sentence
review, the precedent-seeking approach more closely resembles the
methodology of conventional legal research and analysis and seems
more comfortable to the law-trained mind. The danger, however, is that
the precedent-seeking approach usually fails to identify all the cases in
the universe of potentially similar cases that are comparable to the
death sentence case under review.
b. The penalty trial requirement hypothesis
Another possible explanation for the death case bias is that the
Georgia Supreme Court may limit the universe of potentially similar
post-Furman cases to only those in which there was a penalty trial. As
noted earlier, some of the Georgia Supreme Court's opinions suggest
that the comparative sentence review process should consider only jury
sentencing decisions. 144 Furthermore, the actual composition of the cases
that the Georgia Supreme Court's appendices identifies as similar is con-
sistent with the effect of such a restriction. In fact, the appendices to the
court's opinions in the sixty-eight death sentence cases in our study list
only one post-Furman case which did not involve a penalty trial, and all
those that did resulted in a death sentence.
145
142 See supra text accompanying note 38.
143 The most difficult issues involve: (a) the specification of the universe of potentially simi-
lar cases, (b) the specification of appropriate and nonappropriate factors with which to iden-
tify similar cases, and (c) how infrequent death sentencing must be among similar cases before
an individual sentence is deemed excessive.
144 See spra note 55 and accompanying text.
145 Pre-Furman life cases were cited in seven of the appendices of the 68 cases reanalyzed in
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If the Georgia Supreme Court is, in fact, implementing a penalty
trial requirement when selecting its universe of potentially similar cases,
the constitutional implications of that policy deserve emphasis. As pre-
viously mentioned, the United States Supreme Court sustained the con-
stitutionality of the Georgia capital sentencing statute in Gregg because
a majority of the Court believed Georgia's statutory procedures could
prevent arbitrary and capricious death sentences. The Court also iden-
tified Georgia's system of comparative sentence review as an important
safeguard against excessive or discriminatory death sentences. However,
the Court reached that conclusion based on an apparent assumption
that, as Georgia law seemed to require, a penalty trial would occur in
every case in which the defendant was convicted of capital murder.
14 6
Furthermore, if the assumption is correct, a penalty trial requirement
would be redundant; if every capital conviction resulted in a penalty
trial, then the universe of potentially similar cases would include the
sentence imposed on every convicted capital defendant. Thus, the com-
parative sentencing review process would operate upon the basis of
every sentencing decision in every capital case.
147
In fact, however, not every case in which the jury convicts the de-
fendant of capital murder results in a penalty trial. Penalty trials occur
in only forty percent of such cases. In this respect alone, a penalty trial
requirement would exclude from the universe of potentially similar cases
a substantial number of capital convictions, all of which resulted in life
sentences.
A further distortion occurs because defendants who receive life
sentences following penalty trials are less likely to appeal than defend-
ants who received life sentences without undergoing penalty trials (.62
versus .71).148 This statistic is important because the Georgia Supreme
Court also limits the universe of potentially similar cases to those in
this study. The single post-Funnan case cited not involving a penalty trial was Hill v. State,
237 Ga. 610, 229 S.E.2d 419 (1976), listed in the appendix of Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209, 217,
232 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1977).
146 The Georgia statute states that "[fi]n all cases in which the death penalty may be im-
posed and which are tried by a jury, upon a return of a verdict of guilty by the jury, the court
shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence hearing before the jury." GA. CODE ANN.
§ 27-2503(b) (1983). In the event of a guilty plea to murder, the court conducts the penalty
trial and passes sentence. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2528.
147 Since the decisions of prosecutors not to seek a death sentence and of juries not to
impose a death sentence when it is sought by the prosecutor are subject to no direct review by
the Georgia court, comparative sentence review provides the sole basis for reviewing, albeit
indirectly, the impact of those decisions on the evenhandedness of the state's death-sentencing
system.
148 During part of the time period considered in this study, defendants convicted of capital
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment exposed themselves to the possibility of a death
sentence if a successful appeal resulted in a new trial and reconviction. Bullington v. Mis-
souri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), has since eliminated this possibility on constitutional grounds.
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which the defendant appealed. 149 When combined, the penalty trial re-
quirement and the appeal requirement would operate together to ex-
clude from the universe of potentially similar cases eighty-four percent
of the capital convictions in which the defendant received a life sen-
tence. As a consequence, the theoretical efficacy of comparative sen-
tence review in Georgia-an important factor in the Gregg decision-
would be substantially diminished.
In order to test the effects of a penalty trial requirement, we com-
pared death-sentencing frequencies among groups of post-Furman cases
selected as similar by an index method, first including all life sentence
cases in the universe of potentially similar cases and then including only
life sentence cases that included penalty trial. Table 11 depicts the re-
sults of this analysis. Column D of Table 11 indicates the disparity in
death-sentencing rates among the two groups of cases. It suggests that,
except in the most aggravated cases, the penalty trial requirement in-
TABLE 11
AVERAGE DEATH-SENTENCING FREQUENCIES AMONG GROUPS OF
APPEALED CASES WHEN ALL LIFE SENTENCE CASES ARE INCLUDED
AND WHEN ONLY PENALTY TRIAL LIFE SENTENCE CASES ARE
INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS, CONTROLLING FOR THE PREDICTED
LIKELIHOOD OF RECEIVING A DEATH SENTENCE
A B C D E
Predicted Likelihood of
Receiving a Death All Only Appealed
Sentence from 3 (lowest) Appealed Cases With Disparity Ratio
to 8 (highest)a Cases Penalty Trial (Col.C-Col.B) (Col.C-Col.B)
3 .07 (7/101) .32 (7/22) .25* 4.6
4 .21 (11/52) .37 (11/30) .16 1.8
5 .39 (16/41) .84 (16/19) .45* 2.1
6 .81 (26/32) .93 (26/28) .12 1.2
7 .67 (10/15) .91 (10/11) .24 1.4
8 .96 (26/27) .96 (26/27) .0 1.0
Averageb  .52 .72 .20 0.2
a See supra note 98 and accompanying text for a description of the index underlying this
scale. Levels 1 & 2 are omitted from the scale because no death sentences were imposed
among cases at those levels.
b Calculated by dividing the sum of the proportions in each column by 6 (levels 3 through
8).
*Statistically significant beyond the .05 level.
Ward v. State, 239 Ga. at 208-09, 236 S.E.2d at 368, eliminated this possibility when the first
life sentence was imposed by a jury.
149 See in6fa note 160 and accompanying text.
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creases the proportion of death sentence cases within these groupings of
similar cases by more than twenty percent. An additional analysis, not
reported here, that used the salient features method for identifying simi-
lar cases showed the same degree of disparity in death-sentencing
rates. 150
These results suggest that if the Georgia Supreme Court is, in fact,
restricting the universe of potentially similar cases to cases in which a
penalty trial occurred, that practice could explain a substantial propor-
tion of the death case bias that we have observed in the court's appendi-
ces. Furthermore, these results create serious doubts about the legality
of employing a penalty trial requirement in connection with the com-
parative review process, at least in jurisdictions in which only a rela-
tively small proportion of capital convictions result in a penalty trial. 151
c. Limited technology
Another explanation for the discrepancies between the results of
our analyses and the Georgia Supreme Court's sentence review decisions
may simply be the court's reliance on a manual system for storing infor-
mation about prior cases and the absence of efficient procedures for re-
trieving similar cases. A computerized data set and improved
procedures for (a) identifying the similar case selection criteria, and (b)
ensuring a comprehensive search for all similar cases, perhaps by mak-
ing greater use of the Court's Assistant for Proportionality Review,
would greatly facilitate the court's ability to identify all similar cases.
d. The Georgia court's universe of potentially similar cases
For the purpose of our analyses of the sixty-eight death sentence
cases in our study, we employed the same universe of potentially similar
cases as does the Georgia Supreme Court. To achieve this result, we
defined the parameters of the universe of potentially similar cases, as
does the Georgia Supreme Court, in accordance with the following
criteria:
(1) The universe consists of capital cases decided under both the
pre- and post-Furman penalty statutes.
(2) The universe is limited only to those cases in which the defend-
ant appeals to the Georgia Supreme Court.
52
150 The rates were higher when the universe of cases was limited to those that advanced to
a penalty trial.
151 The policy was unsuccessfully challenged in State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d at 20-22 (Sei-
lcr, J., dissenting). It has not been addressed, however, by the Georgia Supreme Court. See
a/so iqfra note 173 and accompanying text.
152 The Georgia statute authorizes the Georgia Supreme Court to consider unappealed
cases in GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(0, but the court does not regularly do so.
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(3) Cases in which the jury imposed a death sentence which, on
appeal, the Georgia court vacated on procedural grounds are classi-
fied as death sentence cases for comparative purposes. 153
Because we employed a universe of potentially similar cases con-
structed within the framework of these rules, they make no contribution
to the observed discrepancies between the results of our analyses and the
Georgia court's sentencing review decisions. Nevertheless, by defining
the relevant universe of potentially similar cases in accordance with
these criteria, the Georgia Supreme Court may have further biased its
sentencing review process in favor of finding that death sentences under
review are not excessive or disproportionate. Indeed, in Gregg v. Geor-
gia 154 the defendant challenged two of these selection criteria for this
very reason. In this section we report the results of analyses designed to
test the effects of these three rules.
In Gregg v. Georgia, the defendant unsuccessfully challenged the
Georgia Supreme Court's policy of considering pre-Furman cases as part
of its death sentence review process. The United States Supreme Court
sustained this policy on the ground that it was necessary "at the incep-
tion of the new procedure in the absence of any post-Funnan cases avail-
able for comparison."' 155 To test the effect of this policy we compared
perceived levels of excessiveness among the sixty-eight death sentence
cases in our study when pre-Funnan cases were included and excluded
from the universe of potentially similar cases.156 The results of this test
suggest that, in general, the inclusion of the pre-Furman cases biases the
results in the direction of finding that death sentences are not excessive
or disproportionate, but that the magnitude of the bias is trivial.
15 7
In Gregg, the United States Supreme Court also sustained the Geor-
gia Supreme Court's policy of considering only appealed cases on the
ground that the Georgia court "has the authority to consider [unap-
153 The Georgia court has never explicitly addressed this issue. An examination of the
court's appendices, however, indicates that the court makes no distinction between prior
death sentence cases in which the death sentence was vacated on procedural grounds and
death sentence cases in which the sentence was affirmed as not excessive or disproportionate.
154 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
155 Id. at 205 n.56.
156 The hypothesis that the inclusion of pre-Furman cases in the comparative sentence re-
view would bias the results is based upon the assumption that many death sentences imposed
during the pre-Furman period were comparatively excessive. Consequently, including those
cases in the analysis creates a risk of skewing the observed sentencing patterns identified in the
comparative sentence review. Whether that skewing effect would necessarily contribute to
the death sentence case bias is not, however, self-evident. There were a substantial number of
highly aggravated pre-Furman life cases which would probably result in a death sentence to-
day. The presence of these cases in the analysis increases the likelihood that pre-Furman life
cases will be identified as similar to a post-Furman death sentence case undergoing a propor-
tionality review.
157 Table 12 below shows the results of this comparison.
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pealed] cases."' 58 The Georgia court has itself justified this practice by
asserting that the appealed cases "represent a sufficient cross section of
similar cases upon which an adequate comparative review can be
made."' 59 Our analysis indicates that limiting the pool of potentially
similar cases to only appealed cases does introduce a pro-death sentence
TABLE 12
Average Death Sentencing Frequencies Among Similar Appealed Cases When Pre-
Furman Cases are Included and Excluded from the Analysis, Controlling for the
Predicted Likelihood of Receiving a Death Sentence




from 1 (lowest) to 8 Pre and Post Furman Post-Furman Disparity
(highest)a Appealed Cases Appealed Cases (Col.B-Col.C)
Death-Sentencing Death-Sentencing
Rate and Sample Rate and Sample
Size Size
1 .0 (0/23) .0 (0/20) .0
2 .02 (3/182) .0 (0/151) .02
3 .07 (8/109) .07 (7/101) .0
4 .22 (14/64) .21 (11/52) .01
5 .44 (20/46) .39 (16/41) .05
6 .83 (29/35) .81 (26/32) .02
7 .69 (11/16) .67 (10/15) .02
8 .96 (26/27) .96 (26/27) .0 -
a See supra note 98 and accompanying text for a description of the index underlying
this scale.
In individual cases, however, the impact may be significant. In an alternative analysis, not
reported here, which used the salient factors method of identifying similar cases, we found
that in two of 68 cases analyzed, the inclusion of the pre-Furman cases substantially affected
the results to the defendant's disadvantage. In the first case there was a 27 percentage point
disparity in the results and in the second case it was 41 points. Overall, however, the results of
the salient features analysis showed that the inclusion of the pre-Furman cases in the analysis
gave defendants a slight (two percentage points) advantage. Any effect from the use of pre-
Furman cases can be expected to decline as time passes and the number of post-Furman cases
increases in proportion to the number of pre-Furman cases. Eventually we expect the court
will limit its universe strictly to post-Furman cases.
158 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 205 n.56.
159 Ross v. State, 233 Ga. 361, 366, 211 S.E.2d 356, 359 (1974). The expectation that the
exclusion of nonappealed cases would bias the results of proportionality review has two foun-
dations. First, although there is an appeal in every case in which a judgment of death is
entered, appeals occur in only 69% of life cases. The pool of potentially similar cases, there-
fore, reflects a sampling rate of 1.00 for death sentence cases, but only .69 for life sentence
cases. Consequently, groups of similar cases drawn from this universe of appealed cases may
systematically underrepresent life cases. This underrepresentation is likely to occur even if, as
the Georgia Supreme Court has asserted, the appealed life cases are a representative sample
of all life sentence cases. To obtain an unskewed picture of the death-sentencing rate among
groups of similar cases that have been appealed, good practice would call for weighting the
appealed life cases to account for the lower appeal rate, ie., each appealed life case would
stand for more than a single case in the calculation of death-sentencing frequencies.
BALDUS, PULASKI, AND WOODWORTH [Vol. 74
bias, but the degree of bias is not large. 160
To our knowledge, no defendant has as yet challenged the Georgia
Supreme Court's practice of classifying as a death sentence case, for the
purpose of comparative sentence review, cases in which the court has
vacated death sentences on procedural grounds. Because the court
reverses on procedural grounds over twenty percent of the death
sentences it reviews (and nearly thirty percent of the death sentences
among the less aggravated cases), it seems likely that this practice would
tend to overstate the presence of death sentence cases in the universe of
potentially similar cases. 16 1 Our analysis is consistent with this expecta-
tion. 162 It indicates that this classification policy does increase the pro-
portion of death sentence cases in the pool of potentially similar cases,
thus favoring a finding that subsequent death sentences are not excessive
or disproportionate. Furthermore, when compared to the results when
one classifies vacated death sentence cases as life cases, the impact is
substantial. However, if one excludes vacated death sentence cases from
the analysis altogether, the impact is not significant.
Thus, it appears that these three policies, which the Georgia court
employs when defining the universe of potentially similar cases, do con-
tribute to some degree to a pro-death sentence bias in the sentence re-
160 Table 13 below presents death-sentencing rates controlling for the predicted likelihood
of receiving a death sentence.
TABLE 13
Death-Sentencing Frequencies Among Similar Cases When Unappealed Cases are
Included and Excluded from the Analysis, Controlling for th Predicted Likelihood of
Receiving a Death Sentence




3 (lowest) to 8 Appealed and Only Appealed Disparity
(highest)a Unappealed Cases Cases (Col.C-Col.B)
3 .07 (9/136) .07 (7/101) .0
4 .14 (12/87) .21 (11/52) .07
5 .33 (17/51) .39 (16/41) .06
6 .74 (26/35) .81 (26/32) .07
7 .67 (10/15) .67 (10/15) .0
8 .96 (26/27) .96 (26/27) .0
a See supra note 98 and accompanying text for a description of the index underlying
this scale. Levels 1 & 2 are omitted from the scale because no death sentences were
imposed among cases at those levels.
161 The possibility exists, therefore, that some death sentence cases considered in the com-
parative sentence review are themselves comparatively excessive. The inclusion of such cases
in the analysis may unjustifiably increase the frequency of death sentences among the cases
found to be similar to the death case under review.
162 Tables 14 and 15 below show the results of the analysis.
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view process. Furthermore, any one of these policies could have a
substantial impact in any individual case. Consequently, we would
question whether the adoption of these policies is justified despite the
possible savings in terms of expense or administrative convenience.
TABLE 14
Death-Sentencing Frequencies Among Groups of Similar Appealed Cases When
Death Sentence Cases Earlier Reversed by the Court on Procedural Grounds are
Treated as Death Cases and When They are Treated as Life Cases
A B C D
Predicted Likelihood All Death Sentence Death Cases
of Receiving a Cases Included in Reversed on
Death Sentence from the Analysis Without Procedural Grounds
3 (lowest) to 8 Regard to Outcome Treated as Life Disparity



















a See supra note 98 and accompanying text for a description of the index underlying
this scale. Levels 1 & 2 are omitted from the scale because no death sentences were
imposed among cases at those levels.
TABLE 15
Death-Sentencing Frequencies Among Groups of Similar Appealed Cases When
Death Sentence Cases Earlier Reversed by the Court on Procedural Grounds are














































a See supra note 98 and accompanying text for a description of the index underlying
this scale. Levels 1 & 2 are omitted from the scale because no death sentences were
imposed among cases at those levels.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Gregg v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of Georgia's post-Furman system of sentence review in
capital cases as a safeguard against comparatively excessive death
sentences. In the words of Justice Stewart, the Georgia Supreme Court's
review process should ensure that no person "sentenced to die by the
action of an aberrant jury will suffer a sentence of death." 163 The Court
reemphasized its view of the constitutional importance of the appellate
review process in the recent decision of Zant v. Stephens.164 The purpose
of this study was to assess the manner in which the Georgia Supreme
Court has actually performed this function, particularly with respect to
sixty-eight death sentence cases which the court reviewed and affirmed
between 1973 and 1979.
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
We found first that Georgia's post-Funman death-sentencing system
continues to impose death sentences which a variety of measures we em-
ployed identify as presumptively excessive.1 65 Second, the Georgia
Supreme Court has never vacated a death sentence imposed in a murder
case on the grounds that it was excessive or disproportionate because of
the infrequency of death sentencing among similar cases. 166 Third,
based on our measures, relatively few of the sixty-eight death sentences
in our sample that the Georgia court affirmed as neither "excessive or
disporportionate" and that we analyzed for evidence of excessiveness
would qualify as presumptively evenhanded. 167 To be sure, we did find
some evidence to support the hypothesis that the Georgia Supreme
Court reverses capital convictions or vacates death sentences on proce-
dural grounds at a higher rate in cases involving arguably excessive
death sentences. 168 But this form of defacto comparative sentence review
is not sufficient to overcome the discrepancy between the court's sen-
tence review decisions and the results of our analysis.
163 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 195.
164 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983).
165 See supra notes 78-106 and accompanying text for a description of the data and the
measures of comparative excessiveness. Seesupra notes 107-17 for a discussion of the standard
used to determine whether death sentences are presumptively excessive or evenhanded, and
see supra notes 118-33 and accompanying text for evidence of the frequency of presumptively
excessive death sentences in Georgia's death-sentencing system.
166 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text for a description of the Georgia court's
record on comparative sentence review. The court has vacated two death sentences on the
ground of excessiveness or disproportionality but not because of an infrequency of death sen-
tencing among similar cases. See supra notes 133-34.
167 See supra text accompanying notes 123-26.
168 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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Our findings also suggest that the Georgia Supreme Court invaria-
bly fails to vacate death sentences as excessive or disporportionate for a
very simple reason: when identifying other cases as "similar" to the
death sentence case under review for comparative purposes, the court
almost exclusively chooses cases that resulted in death sentences; very
rarely does the court include in its appendices of similar cases compara-
ble cases which resulted in a life sentence.169
We also attempted to discover the reasons for this systematic exclu-
sion of life sentence cases. We analyzed the impact of several rules or
conventions that the court sometimes appeared to employ when pre-
scribing the universe of potentially similar cases and when selecting
cases deemed to be comparable to a particular death sentence case from
that universe. 70 We found that the court's practice of including pre-
Furman cases in the universe of potentially similar cases tended to over-
state the proportion of death sentence cases in that universe, but that
the magnitude of the impact was not great. Similarly, we found that the
effects of limiting the universe of potentially similar cases to appealed
cases and of classifying death sentence cases vacated on procedural
grounds as death sentence cases for comparative purposes were much
the same; they tended to encourage the overselection of death sentence
cases, but the extent of impact was not substantial. Certainly, by them-
selves, these practices do not explain the marked variations between the
Georgia Supreme Court's sentencing review decisions and the results of
our analyses.
Other possible explanations that we considered, but were unable to
evaluate statistically, were the impact of the court's rudimentary
method of selecting similar cases and the possibility that at least some
author judges employ a "precedent-seeking" approach to the selection
process rather than the more comprehensive "frequency" approach
characteristic of a true comparative sentence review.' 7 1 It appears, how-
ever, that the most likely explanation for the Georgia court's tendency
systematically to overselect death sentence cases is a policy of consider-
ing only cases in which a penalty trial occurred. Such a policy would
exclude from the universe of potentially similar cases nearly two-thirds
of all the life sentence cases appealed to the court. Our tests indicate,
moreover, that such a policy would explain a substantial portion of the
disparity between the cases listed as "similar" in the court's appendices
and those identified as "similar" by our alternate methods. Conse-
quently, we suspect that the penalty trial requirement, to which the
169 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
170 See supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
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Georgia Supreme Court's opinions sometimes refer, may be the chief
cause for the overselection of death sentence cases as "similar" and the
systematic failure of the court to identify any death sentence as excessive
or disporportionate. 
72
B. EIGHTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
These findings raise serious questions about the actual operation of
Georgia's post-Furman death-sentencing statute. Our data suggest that
Georgia's death-sentencing system has continued to impose the type of
inconsistent, arbitrary death sentences that the United States Supreme
Court condemned in Furman v. Georgia. More importantly, the Georgia
Supreme Court's sentence review process has failed to identify and to
vacate such death sentences-the very function upon which the opinions
in Zant v. Stephens and Gregg placed such emphasis. Consequently, one
could question whether, as applied, Georgia's system for imposing capi-
tal punishment operates in the consistent, evenhanded manner required
by the eighth amendment.
Moreover, the Georgia Supreme Court has made no effort to artic-
ulate a principled method for selecting cases deemed to be similar for
comparative purposes. Because the overall death-sentencing rate is
quite low in death-eligible cases, the statutory aggravating circum-
stances which make those cases death-eligible do not serve to distinguish
between cases resulting in death sentences and all life sentence cases. In
Godfrey v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court vacated a death sen-
tence imposed under the Georgia statute because, as interpreted, the
statutory aggravating circumstance involved in the case did not serve to
distinguish the death sentence case on appeal from other life sentence
cases on any principled basis. 1 73 If Georgia's comparative sentence re-
view process is to serve as a satisfactory means of preventing arbitrary or
excessive death sentences within the group of murder cases for which
capital punishment is legally permissible, the Georgia Supreme Court
must perform that function in a consistent, principled manner. The ob-
scure, possibly inconsistent methods by which the court presently selects
cases deemed to be "similar" for purposes of sentence review do not ap-
pear to satisfy those criteria.
To the extent that the Georgia court's failure to conduct efficacious
comparative sentence reviews results from a policy of considering only
penalty trial cases, an additional constitutional question emerges. In
Gregg, the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that the
existence of prosecutorial discretion in capital cases made the Georgia
172 See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
173 See stepra note 86.
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death-sentencing statute unconstitutional. 174 The Court reached this
conclusion in part because it assumed that prosecutors had no control
over the sentencing process once a capital conviction was obtained and
that all defendants convicted of a capital crime would be sentenced by a
judge or jury in a penalty trial.17 5 Indeed, such an assumption is essen-
tial to the Court's further conclusion that the Georgia Supreme Court's
sentence review process could ensure consistent, evenhanded sentencing
in all capital cases.
176
In fact, however, Georgia prosecutors exercise absolute discretion
over whether the cases of death-eligible defendants convicted of murder
will advance to a penalty trial, and in practice the majority of such de-
fendants do not undergo a penalty trial. 177 In this respect alone, the
assumptions upon which the United States Supreme Court decided
Gregg and the actual operation of the Georgia system differ in a consti-
tutionally significant fashion. Moreover, if the Georgia Supreme Court,
by virtue of a penalty trial only policy, ignores in its comparative sen-
tence reviews the large majority of murder cases in which no penalty
trial is held, these frequent exercises of prosecutorial discretion are insu-
lated against even indirect appellate review. 178
Finally, our analyses suggest that Georgia's death-sentencing sys-
tem is tainted by the influence of arbitrary and capricious factors, nota-
bly the victim's race and the place where the defendant is prosecuted.179
C. THE FUTURE OF COMPARATIVE SENTENCE REVIEW
Various courts have suggested recently that the type of compara-
tive sentence review which the Georgia statute contemplates imposes an
impossible task upon state supreme courts.180 We disagree. Our experi-
ence in this study has persuaded us that a properly conducted sentence
review procedure may be demanding, but is not impossible. We also
believe that state supreme courts, like that of Georgia, can make pru-
dent use of systematic, empirically-based procedures to improve their
own review processes. Because they are computer-assisted, these meth-
ods will facilitate the selection of all presumptively similar cases. They
174 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 199-200, 200 n.50.
175 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
176 Because prosecutorial decisions not to seek, and jury decisions not to impose, death
sentences are not reviewable, comparative sentence review provides the only vehicle for ensur-
ing that defendants sentenced to death receive the same treatment as similarly situated de-
fendants whom prosecutors decide to insulate from the death penalty.
177 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
178 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
180 See supra note 97; see also Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. at 818-26; State v. Copeland, -
S.C. -, -, 300 S.E.2d 63, 77 (1982).
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will permit appellate courts to focus upon the frequency of death
sentences among cases deemed to be similar (and the legal issues attend-
ant to that inquiry) and will free individual jurists from the burden of
subjectively deciding whether individual death sentences are justified by
the facts of the case.
8 '
Quantitative, computer-assisted methods are also especially useful
because they permit the systematic identification of presumptively simi-
lar cases from a variety of perspectives. When different quantitative
methods yield the same general group of presumptively similar cases, as
is likely to happen in connection with highly aggravated review cases, a
court can be confident that the similar cases it seeks are among those
identified by the different measures. If, however, different methods
yield inconsistent results or substantially different groups of arguably
similar cases, the court will be on notice to conduct its review process
with greater caution.
18 2
We emphasize, however, that while a computer can facilitate an
effective and comprehensive comparative sentence review, it only serves
as a point of departure. The computer can assist a court in identifying
other cases that are presumptively similar (because, for example, they
involve common factual elements), but the final determination of com-
parability will require an examination of the case summaries and
records of the cases identified by the computer as presumptively
similar. 1
3
Such a systematic approach to comparative sentence review will
increase the reviewing court's confidence in its choice of "similar" cases.
It should also facilitate the resolution of the legal issues associated with
181 The guided discretion of death-sentencing procedures approved by the United States
Supreme Court are designed to allocate the exercise of subjective judgments of death worthi-
ness to the sentencing authority, usually a jury. The role of the appellate court is to police
these manifestations of contemporary community standards to ensure consistency in the pro-
cess required by the eighth amendment. This is not to suggest that this policing function
requires no subjective judgments. Both the specification of the case characteristics used to
identify similar cases and the determination of how infrequently a death sentence must occur
among similar cases before it is held excessive or disproportionate clearly involve subjective
value judgments. But these judgments are of a quite different order than the determination
that a death-sentenced defendant's moral culpability does or does not justify his death sen-
tence or that the aggravating circumstances of the case outweigh the mitigating
circumstances.
182 In the 68 cases analyzed in this study with three different measures of comparative
excessiveness there were only 12 cases in which the death-sentencing rate among similar cases
was higher than .50 for all three measures.
183 Our experience also indicates that an effective comparative review process can be con-
ducted without any computer assistance even in jurisdictions with caseloads the magnitude of
Georgia's. Moreover, tabulations of the type shown in Appendix B, which can give the court
an overview of the state's entire death-sentencing process, can be constructed through a man-
ual sort of cases.
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the definition of the universe of potentially similar cases, the identifica-
tion of the proper factors to use for selecting similar cases, and the inter-
pretation of death-sentencing frequencies in individual cases. In this
fashion, the reviewing court can enhance the rationality and consistency
of the sentence review process, thereby ensuring greater consistency in
the entire death-sentencing system.
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REVIEW CASE 955
The defendant was a 39-year-old male with a long criminal record.
While on probation, he kidnapped and killed without provocation a fe-




The 24-year-old male defendant shot and killed a 58-year-old male and
a 66-year-old female who surprised him as he was burglarizing their
home. As they pleaded for their lives, he beat the male with a baseball
bat and then shot both of them in the head.
Case 071
While holding up a service station, the 20-year-old AWOL male shot the
attendant five times. The defendant had committed other crimes before
(car theft) and after (aggravated assault) the murder.
Case 074
The defendant bound and killed two victims in their home while com-
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mitting robbery. He was later characterized as depraved of mind after
laughing about the murders.
Case 246
While escaped from a federal prison, the 20-year-old male defendant
killed the victim with a shot to the head during a holdup. He also sexu-
ally molested and shot a witness who survived.
Case 264
While intoxicated, the defendant and his coperpetrator shot a
storekeeper five times in the head and body without provocation during
the course of a holdup. A partial motive included revenge.
Case 279
After hitchhiking a ride, the defendant robbed, shot, and killed the mid-
dle-aged driver and his friend at a roadside stop.
Case 307
Having a prior record of assault, the defendant kidnapped a stranger,
attempted rape, and then murdered the victim. Possible premeditation
was involved.
Case 362
Characterized as having a mental disorder, the defendant forced entry
and robbed his victim's home. He terrorized the family and shot the
victim, who died the following day. Premeditation may or may not
have been involved.
Case 450
The defendant is of low intelligence and was 18 years old at the time.
After drinking and smoking marijuana, the defendant carried out a pre-
meditated scheme to get a car by stabbing a 17-year-old male acquain-
tance 18 times with a butcher knife. Afterward, the defendant tried to
obtain .reward money by giving information to the victim's parents.
Case 459
The 24-year-old defendant and his two coperpetrators beat and then
used a shotgun to shoot the elderly proprietor of a gas-convenience store,
as the victim pled for his life. A bystander was seriously injured, an-
other was robbed, and the shots narrowly missed a milkman who hap-
pened on the scene.
Case 488
The 22-year-old defendant shot to death and then robbed a middle-aged
cab driver in a premeditated scheme.
Case 491
While traveling through the state, the defendant shot and killed the 14-
year-old son of a grocery store owner (after provocation) in the course of
armed robbery. After shooting the son, the defendant then suggested
raping the mother and shot her three times, leaving her for dead.
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Case 510
The 19-year-old male defendant kidnapped and then shot a 50-year-old
woman for the sport of it.
Case 512
The 22-year-old male defendant committed an armed robbery of a gas
station, and the next day he beat and killed a 22-year-old female store
clerk with a hammer after stabbing her seven times.
Case 553
The defendant sodomized and strangled two 7-year-old boys, killing
both.
Case 576
With premeditation, the defendant bound, strangled, tortured, and
robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
Case 577
The mentally unbalanced defendant killed a stranger who reminded
him of his stepmother.
Case 57.9
In a premeditated scheme, the defendant bound, tortured, strangled,
and robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
Case 559
While drunk, the 23-year-old male defendant shot a male victim in his
house during an attempted robbery (after the victim fired at the defend-
ant). Afterwards, the defendant confessed and cooperated with authori-
ties.
REVIEW CASE 495
The 30-year-old male defendant, diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic,
kidnapped the victim who had been lured from his house to aid another
whom the defendant had wounded. Without provocation, the defend-
ant shot the kidnappee as he pled for his life, and took his personal be-




The defendant bound and killed two victims in their home while com-
mitting robbery. He was later characterized as depraved of mind after
laughing about the murders.
Case 307
Having a prior record of assault, the defendant kidnapped a stranger,
attempted rape, and then murdered the victim. Possible premeditation
was involved.
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Case 362
Characterized as having a mental disorder, the defendant forced entry
and robbed his victim's home. He terrorized the family and shot the
victim, who died the following day. Premeditation may or may not
have been involved.
Case 553
The defendant sodomized and strangled two 7-year-old boys, killing
both.
Case 576
With premeditation, the defendant bound, strangled, tortured, and
robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
Case 577
The mentally unbalanced defendant killed a stranger who reminded
him of his stepmother.
Case 420
The young defendant, characterized as a sexual deviant, raped and
murdered his victim without premeditation.
Case 494
The defendant, a disgruntled bank customer, beat and shot a bank vice-
president in his home. Later, the defendant sought to extort money
from the bank with a hostage claim.
Case 551
The defendant sexually tortured and mutilated a woman he forcefully
brought home from a bar. Motive: "To teach that 'nigger-lover' a
lesson."
Case 571
While on a crime spree, the defendant beat, robbed, and killed three
elderly victims in their homes.
Case 578
The mentally retarded defendant killed his ex-wife after beating her and
carving initials in her body.
Case 581
Seeking revenge, the sexually frustrated defendant threw his girlfriend's
2-year-old child off a bridge.
Case 627
The defendant and his coperpetrator robbed, bound, gagged, beat, and
shot the victim five times before burying him alive to prevent their iden-
tification. Defense claimed insanity and the use of drugs; neither was
substantiated by experts. Prosecution claimed the defendant confessed.
Case 628
The defendant and his coperpetrator robbed, bound, gagged, beat, and
shot the victim five times before burying him alive to prevent their iden-
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tification. Defense claimed insanity and the use of drugs; neither was
substantiated by experts. Prosecution claimed the defendant confessed.
REVIEW CASE 621
The defendant and his coperpetrator beat a 74-year-old barber to death
with a knife and a hammer in the course of armed robbery. The victim
sustained massive head wounds and died 31/2 months later. There was
considerable debate whether either or both committed the crime.
APPENDIX CASES
Case 074
The defendant bound and killed two victims in their home while com-
mitting robbery. He was later characterized as depraved of mind after
laughing about the murders.
Case 279
After hitchhiking a ride, the defendant robbed, shot, and killed the mid-
dle-aged driver and his friend at a roadside stop.
Case 307
Having a prior record of assault, the defendant kidnapped a stranger,
attempted rape, and then murdered the victim. Possible premeditation
was involved.
Case 362
Characterized as having a mental disorder, the defendant forced entry
and robbed his victim's home. He terrorized the family and shot the
victim, who died the following day. Premeditation may or may not
have been involved.
Case 450
The defendant was of low intelligence and was 18 years old at the time.
After drinking and smoking marijuana, the defendant carried out a pre-
meditated scheme to get a car by stabbing a 17-year-old male acquain-
tance 18 times with a butcher knife. Afterwards, the defendant tried to
obtain reward money by giving information to the victim's parents.
Case 459
The 24-year-old defendant and his two coperpetrators beat and then
used a shotgun to shoot the elderly proprietor of a gas-convenience store,
as the victim pled for his life. A bystander was seriously injured, an-
other was robbed, and the shots narrowly missed a milkman who hap-
pened on the scene.
Case 488
The 22-year-old defendant shot to death and then robbed a middle-aged
cab driver in a premeditated scheme.
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Case 491
While traveling through the state, the defendant shot and killed the 14-
year-old son of a grocery store owner (after provocation) in the course of
an armed robbery. After shooting the son, the defendant then suggested
raping the mother and shot her three times, leaving her for dead.
Case 510
The 19-year-old male defendant kidnapped and then shot a 50-year-old
woman for the sport of it.
Case 576
With premeditation, the defendant bound, strangled, tortured, and
robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
Case 571
While on a crime spree, the defendant beat, robbed, and killed three
elderly victims in their homes.
REVIEW CASE 991
The defendant beat to death with a hammer a 74-year-old barber while




The defendant bound and killed two victims in their home while com-
mitting robbery. He was later characterized as depraved of mind after
laughing about the murders.
Case 279
After hitchhiking a ride, the defendant robbed, shot, and killed the mid-
dle-aged driver and his friend at a roadside stop.
Case 307
Having a prior record of assault, the defendant kidnapped a stranger,
attempted rape, and then murdered the victim. Possible premeditation
was involved.
Case 362
Characterized as having a mental disorder, the defendant forced entry
and robbed his victim's home. He terrorized the family and shot the
victim, who died the following day. Premeditation may or may not
have been involved.
Case 450
The defendant was of low intelligence and was 18 years old at the time.
After drinking and smoking marijuana, the defendant carried out a pre-
meditated scheme to get a car by stabbing a 17-year-old male acquain-
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tance 18 times with a butcher knife. Afterwards, the defendant tried to
obtain reward money by giving information to the victim's parents.
Case 459
The 24-year-old defendant and his two coperpetrators beat and then
used a shotgun to shoot the elderly proprietor of a gas-convenience store,
as the victim pled for his life. A bystander was seriously injured, an-
other was robbed, and the shots narrowly missed a milkman who hap-
pened on the scene.
Case 188
The 22-year-old defendant shot to death and then robbed a middle-aged
cab driver in a premeditated scheme.
Case 4.91
While traveling through the state, the defendant shot and killed the 14-
year-old son of a grocery store owner (after provocation) in the course of
an armed robbery. After shooting the son, the defendant then suggested
raping the mother and shot her three times, leaving her for dead.
Case 510
The 19-year-old male defendant kidnapped and then shot a 50-year-old
woman for the sport of it.
Case 512
The 22-year-old male defendant committed armed robbery of a gas sta-
tion, and the next day he beat and killed a 22-year-old female store clerk
with a hammer after stabbing her seven times.
Case 576
With premeditation, the defendant bound, strangled, tortured, and
robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
Case 571
While on a crime spree, the defendant beat, robbed, and killed three
elderly victims in their homes.
Case 621
The defendant and his coperpetrator beat a 74-year-old barber to death
with a knife and a hammer in the course of armed robbery. The victim
sustained massive head wounds and died 31/ months later. There was
considerable debate whether either or both committed the crime.
REVIEW CASE 512
The 22-year-old male defendant committed armed robbery of a gas sta-
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tion, and the next day he beat and killed a 22-year-old female store clerk
with a hammer after stabbing her seven times.
APPENDIX CASES
Case 074
The defendant bound and killed two victims in their home while com-
mitting robbery. He was later characterized as depraved of mind after
laughing about the murders.
Case 279
After hitchhiking a ride, the defendant robbed, shot, and killed the mid-
dle-aged driver and his friend at a roadside stop.
Case 307
Having a prior record of assault, the defendant kidnapped a stranger,
attempted rape, and then murdered the victim. Possible premeditation
was involved.
Case 362
Characterized as having a mental disorder, the defendant forced entry
and robbed his victim's home. He terrorized the family and shot the
victim, who died the following day. Premeditation may or may not
have been involved.
Case 450
The defendant was of low intelligence and was 18 years old at the time.
After drinking and smoking marijuana, the defendant carried out a pre-
meditated scheme to get a car by stabbing a 17-year-old male acquain-
tance 18 times with a butcher knife. Afterwards, the defendant tried to
obtain reward money by giving information to the victim's parents.
Case 459
The 24-year-old defendant and his two coperpetrators beat and then
used a shotgun to shoot the elderly proprietor of a gas-convenience store,
as the victim pled for his life. A bystander was seriously injured, an-
other was robbed, and the shots narrowly missed a milkman who hap-
pened on the scene.
Case 488
The 22-year-old defendant shot to death and then robbed a middle-aged
cab driver in a premeditated scheme.
Case 491
While traveling through the state, the defendant shot and killed the 14-
year-old son of a grocery store owner (after provocation) in the course of
an armed robbery. After shooting the son, the defendant then suggested
raping the mother and shot her three times, leaving her for dead.
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Case 510
The 19-year-old male defendant kidnapped and then shot a 50-year-old
woman for the sport of it.
Case 576
With premeditation, the defendant bound, strangled, tortured, and
robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
Case 559
While drunk, the 23-year-old male defendant shot a male victim in his
house during an attempted robbery (after the victim fired at the defend-
ant). Afterwards, the defendant confessed and cooperated with
authorities.
Case 571
While on a crime spree, the defendant beat, robbed and killed three
elderly victims in their homes.
Case 265
Along with five other escaped convicts, the defendants systematically
shot and killed six family members who were unknown to them. The
victims were robbed, and one female victim was raped and mutilated
before being killed.
Case 266
Along with five other escaped convicts, the defendants systematically
shot and killed six family members who were unknown to them. The
victims were robbed, and one female victim was raped and mutilated
before being killed.
Case 267
Along with five other escaped convicts, the defendants systematically
shot and killed six family members who were unknown to them. The
victims were robbed, and one female victim was raped and mutilated
before being killed.
REVIEW CASE 8.10
The defendant, having prior burglary convictions, together with his
coperpetrator, beat a 60-year-old female and her bedridden mother. Af-
ter the beating, the victims were stabbed in the chest with a butcher
knife. After the killings the defendant robbed the house, laughing about
the incident. The burglary was premeditated, but the killings were not.
APPENDIX CASES
Case 071
The defendant bound and killed two victims in their home while com-
mittting robbery. He was later characterized as depraved of mind after
laughing about the murders.
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Case 362
Characterized as having a mental disorder, the defendant forced entry
and robbed his victim's home. He terrorized the family and shot the
victim, who died the following day. Premeditation may or may not
have been involved.
Case 510
The 19-year-old male defendant kidnapped and then shot a 50-year-old
woman for the sport of it.
Case 576
With premeditation, the defendant bound, strangled, tortured, and
robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
Case 579
In a premeditated scheme, the defendant bound, tortured, strangled,
and robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
Case 420
The young defendant, characterized as a sexual deviant, raped and
murdered his victim without premeditation.
Case 571
While on a crime spree, the defendant beat, robbed, and killed three
elderly victims in their homes.
REVIEW CASE 586
The 18-year-old mildly retarded and sexually frustrated defendant beat
and killed two victims and raped a third.
APPENDIX CASES
Case 074
The defendant bound and killed two victims in their home while com-
mitting robbery. He was later characterized as depraved of mind after
laughing about the murders.
Case 279
After hitchhiking a ride, the defendant robbed, shot, and killed the mid-
dle-aged driver and his friend at a roadside stop.
Case 553
The defendant sodomized and strangled two 7-year-old boys, killing
both.
Case 576
With premeditation, the defendant bound, strangled, tortured, and
robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
Case 579
In a premeditated scheme, the defendant bound, tortured, strangled,
and robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
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Case 551
The defendant sexually tortured and mutilated a woman he forcefully
brought home from a bar. Motive: "To teach that 'nigger-lover' a
lesson."
Case 265
Along with five other escaped convicts, the defendants systematically
shot and killed six family members who were unknown to them. The
victims were robbed, and one female victim was raped and mutilated
before being killed.
Case 266
Along with five other escaped convicts, the defendants systematically
shot and killed six family members who were unknown to them. The
victims were robbed, and one female victim was raped and mutilated
before being killed.
Case 267
Along with five other escaped convicts, the defendants systematically
shot and killed six family members who were unknown to them. The
victims were robbed, and one female victim was raped and mutilated
before being killed.
Case 064
The 34-year-old female defendant hired agents to kill her ex-husband
for the insurance money. Both the ex-husband and his second wife were
killed.
Case 573
Presumably desiring money and valuables, the 23-year-old male defend-
ant killed two victims in a secluded area.
Case 980
The 23-year-old male defendant carried out the premeditated murder of
a politically prominent church figure, shooting him in the head and the
chest. He also shot to death other church members in the crowded
church.
REVIEW CASE 627
The defendant and his coperpetrator robbed, bound, gagged, beat, and
shot the victim five times before burying him alive to prevent their iden-
tification. Defense claimed insanity and the use of drugs; neither was
substantiated by experts. Prosecution claimed the defendant confessed.
APPENDIX CASES
Case 074
The defendant bound and killed two victims in their home while com-
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mitting robbery. He was later characterized as depraved of mind after
laughing about the murders.
Case 307
Having a prior record of assault, the defendant kidnapped a stranger,
attempted rape, and then murdered the victim. Possible premeditation
was involved.
Case 362
Characterized as having a mental disorder, the defendant forced entry
and robbed his victim's home. He terrorized the family and shot the
victim, who died the following day. Premeditation may or may not
have been involved.
Case 553
The defendant sodomized and strangled two 7-year-old boys, killing
both.
Case 576
With premeditation, the defendant bound, strangled, tortured, and
robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
Case 577
The mentally unbalanced defendant killed a stranger who reminded
him of his stepmother.
Case 420
The young defendant, characterized as a sexual deviant, raped and
murdered his victim without premeditation.
Case 494
The defendant, a disgruntled bank customer, beat and shot a bank vice-
president in his home. Later, the defendant sought to extort money
from the bank with a hostage claim.
Case 551
The defendant sexually tortured and mutilated a woman he forcefully
brought home from a bar. Motive: "To teach that 'nigger-lover' a
lesson."
Case 571
While on a crime spree, the defendant beat, robbed, and killed three
elderly victims in their homes.
Case 578
The mentally retarded defendant killed his ex-wife after beating her and
carving initials in her body.
Case 581
Seeking revenge, the sexually frustrated defendant threw his girlfriend's
2-year-old child off a bridge.
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Case 586
The 18-year-old mildly retarded and sexually frustrated defendant beat
and killed two victims and raped a third.
REVIEW CASE 672
The defendant, a 24-year-old male with a felony record, robbed a store
and then abducted an 18-year-old female clerk. With his codefendant,
they raped her, shot her twice, and then mutilated the body.
APPENDIX CASES
Case 074
The defendant bound and killed two victims in their home while com-
mitting robbery. He was later characterized as depraved of mind after
laughing about the murders.
Case 279
After hitchhiking a ride, the defendant robbed, shot, and killed the mid-
dle-aged driver and his friend at a roadside stop.
Case 307
Having a prior record of assault, the defendant kidnapped a stranger,
attempted rape, and then murdered the victim. Possible premeditation
was involved.
Case 362
Characterized as having a mental disorder, the defendant forced entry
and robbed his victim's home. He terrorized the family and shot the
victim, who died the following day. Premeditation may or may not
have been involved.
Case 450
The defendant was of low intelligence and was 18 years old at the time.
After drinking and smoking marijuana, the defendant carried out a pre-
meditated scheme to get a car by stabbing a 17-year-old male acquain-
tance 18 times with a butcher knife. Afterwards the defendant tried to
obtain reward money by giving information to the victim's parents.
Case 459
The 24-year-old defendant and his two coperpetrators beat and then
used a shotgun to shoot the elderly proprietor of a gas-convenience store,
as the victim pled for his life. A bystander was seriously injured, an-
other was robbed, and the shots narrowly missed a milkman who hap-
pened on the scene.
Case 488
The 22-year-old defendant shot to death and then robbed a middle-aged
cab driver in a premeditated scheme.
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Case 491
While traveling through the state, the defendant shot and killed the 14-
year-old son of a grocery store owner (after provocation) in the course of
an armed robbery. After shooting the son, the defendant then suggested
raping the mother and shot her three times, leaving her for dead.
Case 553
The defendant sodomized and strangled two 7-year-old boys, killing
both.
Case 559
While drunk, the 23-year-old male defendant shot a male victim in his
house during an attempted robbery (after the victim fired at the defend-
ant). Afterwards, the defendant confessed and cooperated with
authorities.
Case 420
The young defendant, characterized as a sexual deviant, raped and
murdered his victim without premeditation.
REVIEW CASE 628
The defendant and his coperpetrator robbed, bound, gagged, beat, and
shot the victim five times before burying him alive to prevent their iden-
tification. Defense claimed insanity and the use of drugs; neither was
substantiated by experts. Prosecution claimed the defendant confessed.
APPENDIX CASES
Case 074
The defendant bound and killed two victims in their home while com-
mitting robbery. He was later characterized as depraved of mind after
laughing about the murders.
Case 307
Having a prior record of assault, the defendant kidnapped a stranger,
attempted rape, and then murdered the victim. Possible premeditation
was involved.
Case 362
Characterized as having a mental disorder, the defendant forced entry
and robbed his victim's home. He terrorized the family and shot the
victim, who died the following day. Premeditation may or may not
have been involved.
Case 553
The defendant sodomized and strangled two 7-year-old boys, killing
both.
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Case 576
With premeditation, the defendant bound, strangled, tortured, and
robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
Case 577
The mentally unbalanced defendant killed a stranger who reminded
him of his stepmother.
Case 420
The young defendant, characterized as a sexual deviant, raped and
murdered his victim without premeditation.
Case 494
The defendant, a disgruntled bank customer, beat and shot a bank vice-
president in his home. Later, the defendant sought to extort money
from the bank with a hostage claim.
Case 551
The defendant sexually tortured and mutilated a woman he forcefully
brought home from a bar. Motive: "To teach that 'nigger-lover' a
lesson."
Case 571
While on a crime spree, the defendant beat, robbed, and killed three
elderly victims in their homes.
Case 578
The mentally retarded defendant killed his ex-wife after beating her and
carving intitials in her body.
Case 581
Seeking revenge, the sexually frustrated defendant threw his girlfriend's
2-year-old child off a bridge.
Case 586
The 18-year-old mildly retarded and sexually frustrated defendant beat
and killed two victims and raped a third.
Case 627
The defendant and his coperpetrator robbed, bound, gagged, beat, and
shot the victim five times before burying him alive to prevent their iden-
tification. Defense claimed insanity and the use of drugs; neither was
substantiated by experts. Prosecution claimed the defendant confessed.
REVIEW CASE 581
Seeking revenge, the sexually frustrated defendant threw his girlfriend's
2-year-old child off a bridge.
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APPENDIX CASES
Case 510
The 19-year-old male defendant kidnapped and then shot a 50-year-old
woman for the sport of it.
Case 553
The defendant sodomized and strangled two 7-year-old boys, killing
both.
Case 577
The mentally unbalanced defendant killed a stranger who reminded
him of his stepmother.
Case 551
The defendant sexually tortured and mutilated a woman he forcefully
brought home from a bar. Motive: "To teach that 'nigger-lover' a
lesson."
Case 578
The mentally retarded defendant killed his ex-wife after beating her and
carving initials in her body.
REVIEW CASE 593
The 22-year-old male defendant kidnapped two young girls and forced
the older one (10 years old) to perform oral sex three times and then
raped her. The younger girl (8 years old) escaped, but the defendant
caught up with her by a creek and drowned her. Defendant was said to
be unable to control his sexual impulses.
APPENDIX CASES
Case 307
Having a prior record of assault, the defendant kidnapped a stranger,
attempted rape, and then murdered the victim. Possible premeditation
was involved.
Case 491
While traveling through the state, the defendant shot and killed the 14-
year-old son of a grocery store owner (after provocation) in the course of
an armed robbery. After shooting the son, the defendant then suggested
raping the mother and shot her three times, leaving her for dead.
Case 553
The defendant sodomized and strangled two 7-year-old boys, killing
both.
Case 672
The defendant, a 24-year-old male with a felony record, robbed a store
and then abducted an 18-year-old female clerk. With his codefendant,
they raped her, shot her twice, and then mutilated her body.
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Case 420
The young defendant, characterized as a sexual deviant, raped and
murdered his victim without premeditation.
Case 581
Seeking revenge, the sexually frustrated defendant threw his girlfriend's
2-year-old child off a bridge.
Case 265
Along with five other escaped convicts, the defendants systematically
shot and killed six family members who were unknown to them. The
victims were robbed, and one female victim was raped and mutilated
before being killed.
Case 266
Along with five other escaped convicts, the defendants systematically
shot and killed six family members who were unknown to them. The
victims were robbed, and one female victim was raped and mutilated
before being killed.
Case 267
Along with five other escaped convicts, the defendants systematically
shot and killed six family members who were unknown to them. The
victims were robbed, and one female victim was raped and mutilated
before being killed.
REVIEW CASE 704
The 36-year-old male defendant, with a history of psychiatric difficulty,
held up a bar and killed, with three shots, an off-duty policeman who
interrupted him. He then wounded the policeman's companion and
kidnapped a bar employee who was the primary witness. The bar em-
ployee was not harmed.
APPENDIX CASES
Case 074
The defendant bound and killed two victims in their home while com-
mitting robbery. He was later characterized as depraved of mind after
laughing about the murders.
Case 307
Having a prior record of assault, the defendant kidnapped a stranger,
attempted rape, and then murdered the victim. Possible premeditation
was involved.
Case 362
Characterized as having a mental disorder, the defendant forced entry
and robbed his victim's home. He terrorized the family and shot the
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victim, who died the following day. Premeditation may or may not
have been involved.
Case 553
The defendant sodomized and stranged two 7-year-old boys, killing
both.
Case 576
With premeditation, the defendant bound, strangled, tortured, and
robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
Case 577
The mentally unbalanced defendant killed a stranger who reminded
him of his stepmother.
Case 420
The young defendant, characterized as a sexual deviant, raped and
murdered his victim without premeditation.
Case 494
The defendant, a disgruntled bank customer, beat and shot a bank vice-
president in his home. Later, the defendant sought to extort money
from the bank with a hostage claim.
Case 551
The defendant sexually tortured and mutilated a woman he forcefully
brought home from a bar. Motive: "To teach that 'nigger-lover' a
lesson."
Case 571
While on a crime spree, the defendant beat, robbed, and killed three
elderly victims in their homes.
Case 578
The mentally retarded defendant killed his ex-wife after beating her and
carving initials in her body.
Case 581
Seeking revenge, the sexually frustrated defendant threw his girlfriend's
2-year-old child off a bridge.
Case 627
The defendant and his coperpetrator robbed, bound, gagged, beat, and
shot the victim five times before burying him alive to prevent their
identification. Defense claimed insanity and the use of drugs; neither
was substantiated by experts. Prosecution claimed the defendant
confessed.
Case 628
The defendant and his coperpetrator robbed, bound, gagged, beat, and
shot the victim five times before burying him alive to prevent their iden-
tification. Defense claimed insanity and the use of drugs; neither was
substantiated by experts. Prosecution claimed the defendant confessed.
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Case 495
The 30-year-old male defendant, diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic,
kidnapped the victim who had been lured from his house to aid another
whom the defendant had wounded. Without provocation, the defend-
ant shot the kidnappee as he pled for his life, and took his personal be-
longings. The defendant was then arrested after a shoot-out with the
police.
REVIEW CASE 992
The 17-year-old defendant together with coperpetrators kidnapped,
robbed, and murdered a 64-year-old man. Upon abduction, the victim
was forced into the trunk of a car, and as he pled for his life, the defend-
ant shot the victim in the shoulder, and his coperpetrator shot him in
the head with a double-barrelled shotgun. Defendant laughed at the
incident and said the murder was racially motivated.
APPENDIX CASES
Case 074
The defendant bound and killed two victims in their home while com-
mitting robbery. He was later characterized as depraved of mind after
laughing about the murders.
Case 307
Having a prior record of assault, the defendant kidnapped a stranger,
attempted rape, and then murdered the victim. Possible premeditation
was involved.
Case 362
Characterized as having a mental disorder, the defendant forced entry
and robbed his victim's home. He terrorized the family and shot the
victim, who died the following day. Premeditation may or may not
have been involved.
Case 553
The defendant sodomized and strangled two 7-year-old boys, killing
both.
Case 576
With premeditation, the defendant bound, strangled, tortured, and
robbed two elderly victims, both of whom died.
Case 577
The mentally unbalanced defendant killed a stranger who reminded
him of his stepmother.
Case 420
The young defendant, characterized as a sexual deviant, raped and
murdered his victim without premeditation.
BALDUS, PULASKI, AND WOOD WORTH
Case 494
The defendant, a disgruntled bank customer, beat and shot a bank vice-
president in his home. Later, the defendant sought to extort money
from the bank with a hostage claim.
Case 551
The defendant sexually tortured and mutilated a woman he forcefully
brought home from a bar. Motive: "To teach that 'niggerlover' a
lesson."
Case 571
While on a crime spree, the defendant beat, robbed, and killed three
elderly victims in their homes.
Case 578
The mentally retarded defendant killed his ex-wife after beating her and
carving initials in her body.
Case 581
Seeking revenge, the sexually frustrated defendant threw his girlfriend's
2-year-old child off a bridge.
Case 627
The defendant and his coperpetrator robbed, bound, gagged, beat, and
shot the victim five times before burying him alive to prevent their iden-
tification. Defense claimed insanity and the use of drugs; neither was
substantiated by experts. Prosecution claimed the defendant confessed.
Case 628
The defendant and his coperpetrator robbed, bound, gagged, beat, and
shot the victim five times before burying him alive to prevent their iden-
tification. Defense claimed insanity and the use of drugs; neither was
substantiated by experts. Prosecution claimed the defendant confessed.
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